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I.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

The claims in this appeal arise out of the suicide of Bradley Munroe ("Munroe") on
September 29, 2008, while incarcerated at the Ada County Jail ("Jail").
A.

Procedural History.

On January 23, 2009, Rita Hoagland, Munroe's mother ("Hoagland"), filed her first
complaint in this case ("First Complaint"). Hoagland brought her lawsuit individually and in her
capacity as personal representative of Munroe's estate ("Estate").

Hoagland named as

defendants Ada County Sheriff Gary Raney ("Sheriff'), several Sheriff s deputies, and Leslie
Robertson, the Administrative Supervisor for the Jail's Health Services Unit ("Defendants"),]
and alleged that detention deputies were watching a televised football game instead of observing
Munroe. The First Complaint included: (i) a civil rights § 1983 claim by the Estate against the
Defendants (except for the Sheriff) regarding a violation of Munroe's constitutional rights; (ii) a
state tort action for wrongful death by the Estate and Hoagland against all of the Defendants; and
(iii) a state tort action for intentional infliction of emotional distress by Hoagland against
Robertson.
Due to the lack of evidence supporting such claims, on May 28, 2010, the Defendants
filed a dispositive Motion for Summary Judgment, a supporting Memorandum, and fourteen (14)
supporting Affidavits.

I For clarity purposes, the defendants in this appeal will collectively be referred to as "the
Defendants," even though the defendants changed when Hoagland filed her amended complaints.
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On June 23, 2010, Hoagland and the Estate filed their Opposition to the Motion.
However, instead of addressing the defenses, Hoagland and the Estate elected to withdraw all of
their state law claims and dismiss all of the Defendants except for the Sheriff. Hoagland and the
Estate also sought leave to amend their First Complaint to allege entirely new causes of action
under § 1983 against different defendants regarding Munroe's medical treatment.
At a hearing on July 8, 2010, the District Court granted Hoagland and the Estate's request
to amend their First Complaint and denied the Defendants' request for discovery protection,
which allowed Hoagland and the Estate to conduct further discovery and continued the summary
judgment proceeding indefinitely. Hoagland and the Estate filed their Amended Complaint on
July 12, 2010, but did not serve it on any of the Defendants. Instead, a month later, they sought
leave to file a Second Amended Complaint to add additional allegations and, a day later, sought
leave to file a Third Amended Complaint to add a claim for punitive damages.
At a September 13, 2010, hearing, the District Court allowed Hoagland and the Estate to
proceed with their Third Amended Complaint, which was ninety (90) pages long and contained
four hundred sixty-six (466) paragraphs.

It alleged federal § 1983 claims against all new

Defendants, and bared little resemblance to the First Complaint.
On September 20, 2010, the Defendants filed a Motion to Dismiss the Third Amended
Complaint, based on the ineligibility of the Estate and Hoagland as § 1983 plaintiffs under Idaho
law. By Memorandum and Order dated November 2, 2010, the District Court agreed with the
Defendants and determined that the Estate was not a valid plaintiff. However, the District Court
held that Hoagland had standing to continue her lawsuit.
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In light of the major shift in Hoagland's underlying theories and culpable parties, the
Defendants revised their defenses and file a new summary judgment motion, this time tailored to
the § 1983 claims alleged against the new Defendants. The Defendants' Restated Motion for
Summary Judgment and Memorandum were filed on November 12,2010. The District Court's
January 20, 2011, Memorandum Decision and Order granted summary judgment in favor of Ada
County, every Defendant in his or her official capacity, and every Defendant in his or her
personal capacity save for social worker James Johnson ("Johnson").
Both Hoagland and Johnson (the only remaining Defendant) moved the District Court to
reconsider its summary judgment decision. On March 28, 2011, the District Court entered its
Order Granting Defendant's Motion for Reconsideration and Denying Plaintiffs Motion for
Reconsideration, which dismissed Hoagland's lawsuit in its entirety by dismissing Johnson.
Prevailing parties by virtue of the dismissals, on March 4, 2011, the Defendants brought a
motion to recoup taxpayer dollars expended in its defense of the variety of claims brought by the
Estate and Hoagland. That Motion for Costs and Attorney Fees was denied in its entirety in the
March 30, 2011, District Court's Order. Since it was not clear that the District Court intended to
deny costs, the Defendants filed a Motion for Clarification and/or Reconsideration of the March
30,2011, Order, and a hearing was held on September 15,2011. On October 17,2011, the
District Court issued its Order, which awarded the Defendants their costs as a matter of right and
additional discretionary costs.
On May 4, 2011, Hoagland filed her Notice of Appeal, and the Final Judgment was
entered on May 25, 2011. Hoagland filed an Amended Notice of Appeal on October 28,2011.
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B.

Factual Background. 2
Munroe was born in Portland, Oregon, in January 1989.

05/2811 0 Dickinson Aff.

(pending augmentation). Early in his life, Munroe moved to California and eventually to Canyon
County, Idaho. ld.

He became disruptive in school and ultimately became involved in the

juvenile criminal justice system. ld., R. p. 3851, Ex. 4 (Lundt Aff., Ex. A, p. 5). By age thirteen
(13), Munroe was no longer living at home full-time. ld. From June 2002 to February 2003,
Munroe was living at the Nampa Boys Home. Id., Ex. 4 (Lundt Aff., Ex. A, p. 6). At age
fourteen (14), he was committed to the Idaho Juvenile Department of Correction. Id. For the
next few years he was under IJDOC's jurisdiction and control until his release in May 2006. Id.
Although Hoagland continued to live in Melba, over the next few years Munroe was
intermittently homeless in California, Utah, Boise, Melba, Caldwell and Nampa. Id. Munroe
also spent time in various county jails.

Id.; R. pp. 148-150. Munroe was in a Utah jail in

September of 2007, and again in May of 2008. R. p. 3851, Ex. 4 (Lundt Aff., Ex. A, p. 7). In
Idaho, Munroe was booked into the Jail on October 27,2007, July 4, 2008, August 28, 2008, and
September 28, 2008. R. pp. 148-150.
Munroe's August 28, 2008, incarceration resulted from his attempt to steal $5.00 from a
Winco grocery store in Boise. R. p. 3851, Ex. 1 (Robinson Aff., Ex. A, p. 5). He was sentenced
to thirty (30) days in the Jail. R. p. 148-150. With credit for time served, he was released on
September 26, 2008. Id.

2 As Hoagland's version of the facts is quite limited, the Defendants are compelled to provide
their own account.
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Two (2) days later, on September 28, 2008, Munroe robbed a Maverick Country Store in
Boise, threatening the clerk by telling her he had a bomb inside his backpack. R. p. 3851, Ex. 1
(Robinson Aff., Ex. B); R. p. 146, , 7. The clerk gave Munroe the money from the cash register.
R. p. 3851, Ex. 1 (Robinson Aff., Ex. B); R. p. 146,

~

7. Munroe fled the Maverick Store on a

bicycle and was apprehended a short time later by the Boise City Police. R. p. 146, "

5-6.

Munroe told the officers there was cash in the backpack, but no bomb, and that he wanted an
attorney. !d. at , 7.
The arresting officers noted a strong odor of alcohol about Munroe. Id. at , 6. After
being placed in their patrol car he became uncooperative, kicking and hitting his head against the
windows. Id. at, 8. The officers hobbled him and drove to the Boise Police Department. Id. at
, 8; R. p. 147, , 9. The officers then called the paramedics, who transported Munroe to the
emergency room at Saint Alphonsus Regional Medical Center to be cleared for admittance to the
Jail. 3 Id.
At the hospital, Munroe was examined by the emergency room medical staff, and the
doctor's diagnostic impressions were: "acute alcohol intoxication, polysubstance abuse, abrasion
secondary to apprehension by police tonight with resistance, and chronic back pain." R. p. 3851,
Ex. 4 (Lundt Aff., Ex. A, p. 5). The doctor cleared Munroe to be transported and housed at the
Jail. R. p. 147, ~ 10. The officers then transported Munroe to the Jail. Id.

In the Appellant's Brief, Hoagland incorrectly represents that, "[t]he arresting officers found
Bradley's behavior so bizarre that they took him to the hospital for evaluation." Appellant's
Brief, p. 3 (emphasis added).

3
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Once at the Jail, Munroe began the booking process. R. p. 160,

~

5. Part of the booking

process involves taking the fingerprints of arrestees and asking a standard set of questions to
determine the health and wellbeing of the individual. R. p. 142, , 4. Munroe continued to be
uncooperative, and the booking deputies were unable to complete this process. R. p. 160, " 6-7.
The deputies placed Munroe in one of the holding cells next to the booking area due to his
continued behavior and for his wellbeing. R. p. 160, , 7. When an inmate is placed in such a
cell, the deputies begin an Inmate Housing Security Check Log ("Log"), which is located by the
holding cell door. R. p. 160, , 9. It contains space for deputies to record each time the inmate is
checked and monitored, and also a comment section.

Jd.

The deputies monitored Munroe
4

closely and checked on him every fifteen (15) minutes for approximately nine (9) hours. R. p.
160, , 8 Ex. A.
The next morning, September 29, 2008, at approximately 8:00 a.m., Deputy Jeremy
Wroblewski ("Wroblewski"), a booking deputy in training, resumed the booking process by
fingerprinting Munroe and completing a booking form that contained mental health questions.
R. p. 142, " 4, 5, 8. When Wroblewski asked Munroe these questions, Munroe answered that
he was thinking about, had thought about and had previously attempted suicide. Jd. at , 8.
Munroe then explained that he was thinking about suicide earlier, but not now. Jd.; R. p. 3291.

In the Appellant's Brief, Hoagland alleges that while in the holding cell, Munroe's clothes were
taken away after he "tried to strangle himself with them." Appellant's Brief, p. 3. As noted in
the Log, Munroe's clothes were removed, "as he was trying to take string and wrap around his
neck." R. p. 164. There is nothing in the Record that supports Hoagland's allegation that
Munroe was "strangling" himself.
4
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A booking deputy also contacted the Jail's Health Services Unit ("HSU"). R. p. 142, ';5.
Ada County employs psychiatric social workers that conduct assessments of inmates to
determine their mental status and level of functioning, for the purpose of determining if any
intervention is warranted. R. pp. 156-157,

,;~

5-9. Johnson, a Masters level psychiatric social

worker, came to the booking area and assessed Munroe.

5

R. p. 142, ~~ 5-6.

As part of the assessment process, Johnson first reviewed the Jail's medical records to see
if the Jail had previously cared for Munroe. R. p. 137, ,; 17. The medical records showed that
Johnson had previously assessed Munroe on September 1, 2008. Id. at
Munroe's previous medical and psychological information.

~

18. Johnson reviewed

Id. at ,; 17. Johnson noted that

Munroe denied suicidal ideation during his previous incarceration at the Jail, and he could find
no information that he in any way attempted to hurt himself during that incarceration. Id. at ~ 18.
The next step of the assessment process involved speaking with Munroe. R. p. 138, ~ 19.
Johnson met with Munroe in the booking area of the Jail. Id. at,;,; 18-19; R. p. 142,

~,;

5-6.

Munroe told Johnson that he was not suicidal. R. p. 138, ,; 21. Munroe explained that he was
intoxicated/high the previous night and that was the explanation for his behavior. Id. Munroe
assured Johnson, and later Wroblewski, that he would not hurt himself. Id.; R. p. 142, ~ 8.

Johnson came to the Jail with twenty (20) years of prior experience. R. p. 136, ,;,; 4-11. After
graduating from the University of Southern California in 1984 with a Masters Degree in Social
Work, Johnson worked in a hospital, counseling patients with injuries, cancer and discharge
planning. Id. at ~,; 6- 7. Later he worked with and counseled homeless individuals and provided
mental health services to low-income populations. Id. at ,; 8. He has also worked with
chronically mentally ill patients as well as with crisis intervention, suicide and emergency
response teams. Id. at,; 9. He had experience working in juvenile detention facilities and jails,
counseling inmates and assessing the likelihood that they would harm themselves. Id. at ~ 10.
5
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Next, Johnson directly observed Munroe as he completed the booking process. R. pp.
137-138,

'i~

18,19,22. It was important for Johnson to observe Munroe, his affect, and how he

interacted with and answered Wroblewski's questions. Id. at

~~

19,21-22. Johnson observed

that Munroe followed directions, was not distracted and expressed himself properly. Id. at ~~ 19,
22. Munroe's reactions to instructions were appropriate, and he was alert, calm and cooperative.

Id. at

~

22. There was no evidence of current sadness, distress, emotional lability, inattention,

distractibility, or of any distortion in Munroe's thought process. Id. In other words, he appeared
to be coping with his current circumstances and interacting with staff without difficulty. Id.
Based on his assessment, Johnson (relying on his training and twenty (20) years of experience)
determined that Munroe's suicide risk level was not sufficient to warrant admission to the Jail's
HSU. R. p. 139, ~ 25.
At approximately 10:00 a.m. that morning, Hoagland called the HSU. R. p. 152,
Robertson, the HSU's Administrative Supervisor, answered the telephone. Id. at
was not familiar with either Munroe or Hoagland. Id. at

~~

~

~~

4-5.

5. Robertson

4, 7. Hoagland told Robertson that

Munroe was arrested and in the Jail, and that he was nineteen (19) and homeless. Id. at

~

6.

Hoagland also told Robertson that Munroe had attempted suicide in the past, and she had heard
that he may be suicidal again. Id. at ~ 8.
Robertson discussed the HSU with Hoagland, including what a suicide watch entailed.

Id. at

~

9. Due to privacy concerns, Robertson was unable to tell Hoagland anything else other

than she would pass on the information to a social worker. Id.

After they hung up, Johnson

walked into Robertson's office and she relayed to him the contents of Hoagland's call. R. p. 153,
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~

10; R. p. 139,

~

26. Robertson then called Hoagland and told her a social worker was aware of

Munroe. R. p. 153,

~

ll. Johnson, who had just finished his assessment, took the information

from Hoagland into consideration and did not change his assessment. R. p. 139, ~ 27.
After Munroe's booking was complete, Wroblewski asked Deputy Ryan Donelson
("Donelson") to escort Munroe from the booking area to the Closed Custody Unit ("CCU") for
housing in a multi-person cell.

R. p. 167,

~

4.

On the way to the CCU, Munroe stopped

Donelson and said that he needed to be in protective custody ("PC") because he could not live
with other people, and that everyone wanted to kill him. Id. at

~

5. When Donelson asked who

wanted to harm him, Munroe replied that he was into a lot of stuff and everyone wanted to kill
him. Id. at

~~

5-6. Donelson asked Munroe if he could name those he was having trouble with,

and Munroe said no. R. p. 168, ~ 7.
Because of Munroe's concerns for his own safety, Donelson placed him in a holding cell
in the CCU area and let the classification deputies know of Munroe's safety concerns. Id. at ~ 8.
For Munroe's protection and safety from other inmates, the classification deputy, Mike Drinkall
("Drinkall"), located an empty cell in the "side chute" of Cellblock 7. R. p. 132,

~~

4-5. The

side chute is a group of smaller cells to the side of the day room in Cellblock 7, where PC
inmates are commonly housed. R. p. 168,
and headed to Cellblock 7. Id. at

~

~

8. Donelson took Munroe out of the holding cell

9. Drinkall called Johnson to inform him of Munroe's cell

placement in the side chute. R. p. 133,

~

6.

When Donelson and Munroe arrived at Cellblock 7, Munroe started a conversation with
some of the other inmates, laughing and joking with them.
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R. p. 168,

~

10.

Munroe told

Donelson that he would be okay in that Cellblock, and that he would just live there, stating that
he would be just fine there. Id.

Donelson told Munroe that Cellblock 7 was not a pre-

classification area (Munroe was not yet classified on his new charge). Id. A deputy assigned to
Cellblock 7 met them and Munroe was taken to his cell in the side chute. Id. at ~ 11.
At approximately 7:00 p.m. that evening, housing Deputy Kevin Manning ("Manning")
conducted a standing headcount of the inmates. R. p. 171,

~'r

3-4. As part of the headcount,

Manning walked the entire Cellblock 7, day room, and side chute, making sure he saw every
inmate. Id He looked in on each inmate and spoke with him and, even if an inmate was asleep,
the inmate had to stand and speak to Manning. Id This is to ensure that each inmate is safe,
healthy, and is accounted for. Id
During the standing headcount, Munroe requested that Manning take his food tray from
his cell. Id at

~5.

Munroe was not acting in any fashion that alerted Manning that he might

harm himself. Id Had Manning observed Munroe acting or indicating in any manner that he was
contemplating harm to himself, Manning would have intervened immediately. R. p. 172,

~

11.

In addition to the standing headcount, wellbeing checks of the inmates also take place. R.
p. 171,

~

6; R. p. 122,

~

5.

Housing Deputy Marshall McKinley ("McKinley") conducted

wellbeing checks of the inmates in Cellblock 7, including Munroe. R. p. 122,

~~

5-7. During a

wellbeing check, deputies make sure all of the inmates are safe and well by listening to the
imnates to make sure they are all getting along, and interceding when necessary. Id at ~ 5. They
also walk by the cells and look in on the inmates to make sure they are well. Id at ~ 6.
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At 8:08 p.m., McKinley began a wellbeing check of Cellblock 7, starting with the main
tier and ending with the side chute where Munroe was housed. Id. at

~

7. McKinley did not

notice anything out of the ordinary in Munroe's cell. Id. If McKinley had observed Munroe
acting or indicating in any manner that he was contemplating harm to himself, McKinley would
have intervened immediately. R. p. 123,

~

10.

At 8:35 p.m., McKinley began another wellbeing check of Cellblock 7, this time starting
with the side chute in which Munroe was housed.

Id. at

~

8.

When McKinley looked in

Munroe's cell, he appeared to have a sheet wrapped around his neck and was in a sitting position
at the end of the bunk. Id.

McKinley immediately radioed Deputy Michael Vineyard for

assistance, then called Central Control to let him into the cell, and then called for a Code 3
Assist. Id.

McKinley ran into the cell and started removing the sheet from Munroe's neck,

checked for breathing and a pulse, and after finding neither, he and another deputy lifted Munroe
free of the sheet and laid him in the center of the cell and started CPR immediately. Id.
A nurse from the HSU quickly arrived and took over CPR for McKinley. Id. at

~

9.

Several deputies had arrived in Cellblock 7 by this time and the paramedics arrived on scene
shortly thereafter. Id.

The paramedics transported Munroe out of Cellblock 7, continuing to

conduct CPR. Id. The paramedics transported Munroe to Saint Alphonsus Regional Medical
Center, where he was later pronounced dead.

II.

ADDITIONAL ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL

Whether the Defendants are entitled to an award of attorney fees on appeal, pursuant to

I.e. §§ 12-121,12-123, I.A.R. 41, and/or 42 U.S.C. § 1988(b).
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III.

ARGUMENT

The Defendants submit that neither the Estate nor Hoagland are proper plaintiffs in this
case. As the District Court recognized, and as argued below, the Estate cannot bring a § 1983
cause of action in Idaho. And, as argued in the Defendants' Cross-Appeal, Hoagland, as a parent
of an adult child, should be prohibited from bringing such an action in Idaho.

Since both

Plaintiffs lack standing, the entire case should be dismissed on appeal.
Nevertheless, if one or both of the Plaintiffs are allowed to proceed, the dismissal of the
remaining Defendants should still be upheld. Hoagland asserts that the District Court incorrectly
dismissed the following individually named Defendants

James Johnson, Jeremy Wroblewski,

and Kate Pape. As argued below, the District Court applied the correct legal standards and
correctly dismissed each of them. The District Court also correctly dismissed Ada County, as
Hoagland is unable to establish a valid Monell claim against Ada County.
Finally, as the prevailing parties, the award of both costs as a matter of right and
discretionary costs to the Defendants should be upheld. Since Hoagland cannot prove that the
District Court abused its discretion, such award should be upheld on appeal.
A.

The District Court Correctly Held That Munroe's Estate Is Not a Valid Plaintiff.
When dismissing the Estate from this lawsuit, the District Court held:
In sum, Idaho law does not allow Munroe's estate to bring a claim. Standing
alone, such an outcome might be inconsistent with the policies underlying 42
U.S.C. § 1983. However, because, when viewed through the larger lens of the
entirety ofIdaho's survivorship law, such an outcome is not inconsistent with the
U.S. Supreme Court's holding in Robertson, the claim brought on behalf of
Munroe's estate and by Ms. Hoagland as an heir to Munroe's estate must be
dismissed.
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R. p. 1584. Such analysis is correct, and the outcome should be upheld.
1.

Standard of Review.

The District Court dismissed the Estate based on the Defendants' Motion to Dismiss.
Regarding the proper standard of review, this Court has held:
The standards for reviewing a district court's dismissal under Idaho Rule of Civil
Procedure I2(b)( 6) and granting summary judgment are similar but not identical.
Youngv. CityoJKetchum, 137 Idaho 102, 104, 44 P.3d 1157, 1159(2002). As to
both, "the non-moving party is entitled to have all inferences ... viewed in his
favor." Id. However, a 12(b)(6) motion looks only to the complaint to determine
whether the plaintiff has stated a claim for relief. I d.

Independent School Dist. oj Boise City v. Harris Family Ltd., 150 Idaho 583, 587,249 P.3d 382,
386, (2011).
2.

The District Court Was Correct in Holding That an Estate Cannot Be a Valid
§ 1983 Plaintiff Under Idaho Law.

As the District Court recognized, this Court has never allowed an estate to bring a § 1983
action. This matter was a main issue for this Court in Evans v. Twin Falls County, 118 Idaho
210, 796 P.2d 87 (1990). In that case, Mrs. Evans, along with her husband, brought § 1983
claims against Twin Falls County Sheriffs deputies arising from an altercation that took place
during the execution of a writ. Mrs. Evans died during the pendency of the litigation. After her
death, the complaint was amended to join her estate as a plaintiff and the district court treated the
matter as also including a wrongful death claim in light of the allegation that the death of Mrs.
Evans was caused by the actions of the defendants. Id. at 213, 90.
In that case, this Court discussed § 1983 claims and whether those constitutional claims
survived Mrs. Evans' death. This Court held that "the common law has not been modified or
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changed in Idaho either by statute or the Constitution, and therefore the general common law rule
that personal causes of action do not survive the death of the injured party is the rule in Idaho."

Id. at 217, 94 (citations omitted). This Court then explained that "[t]he § 1983 cause of action,
by virtue of the statute's express language, is a personal cause of action, actionable only by
persons whose civil rights have been violated. Thus, under Idaho law Mrs. Evans' § 1983 action
does not survive." Id. 6
The Evans decision regarding the right of survival has been the law in this State for over
twenty (20) years and is still controlling, and Hoagland offers no legitimate argument for
oveliurning that decision.
Underscoring the inability of an estate to bring a § 1983 claim in Idaho is Judge Boyle's
decision in Anderson v. Correctional Medical Services, 2005 WL 3263896 (D.Idaho Nov. 18,
2005) (No. CV 02-155-S-LMB).

In Anderson, an inmate brought a § 1983 cause of action

against a prison's health providers for failing to treat his cancer that resulted in his death during
the pendency of the action. The Idaho federal district court noted that "[a] cause of action under
42 U.S.C. § 1983 survives the death of a plaintiff for the benefit of plaintiffs estate only if the
law of the forum state creates a right of survival," and that this issue was squarely dealt with in

Evans.

Anderson, 2005 WL 3263896 at *2.

More importantly, and despite Judge Boyle's

reservations, the court ruled that:

See also, Vulk v. Haley, 112 Idaho 855, 857-59, 736 P.2d 1309, 1311-13 (1987) (representative
of decedent not allowed to bring wrongful death claim against alleged tortfeasor causing the
injury).
6
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[T]he Evans holding appears to restrict all § 1983 claims in which the plaintiff
dies before a trial, including a scenario in which the defendant allegedly caused
the death of the plaintiff. .. .This court can not, on its own initiative, limit the
plainly-broad holding of Evans even to prevent abuses, i.e., even to discourage
defendants from delaying litigation in the anticipation of a plaintiff's death in
order to achieve an abatement of the claims against them. 7 Clearly, Evans holds
that all § 1983 claims abate upon the Plaintiff's death.

Id. at 3 (emphasis added).
Thus, not only has this Court squarely ruled that an estate cannot bring this type of action,
in addition, an Idaho federal district court interpreting and applying this COUl1's decision in a §
1983 action reached the same conclusion. 8 As recognized by the District Court, any civil rights
claim in this matter was personal to Munroe and did not survive his passing. Therefore, the
Estate cannot bring this action, and was properly dismissed by the District Court.
3.

Hoagland Has Misconstrued Case Law.

Hoagland argues that the District Court (and impliedly the Federal District Court in

Anderson) engaged in an overbroad reading of Evans when precluding the Estate from bringing a
§ 1983 action. She forwards that Evans is limited to instances where the underlying cause of the

claim did not result in the decedent's death. However, this Court did not restrict its holding to
9
.
suc h Instances.

Further, as cited to above, Anderson dismissed the identical argument,

explaining that Evans restricts all § 1983 claims in which a plaintiff dies before trial, including
the scenario in which the defendant allegedly caused the death. Jd.
7 This

concern could not be an issue here given that the claims arose as a result of a suicide.
8 See also, Gomez v. Reinke, 2008 WL 3200794 (D. Idaho August 7, 2008) (No. CV91-299-SLMB).
9 In fact, Evans was a case where the plaintiff alleged that the underlying cause of the claim did
result in the decedent's death. Evans, 118 Idaho at 213, 796 P .2d at 90.

RESPONDENTS' BRIEF

PAGE 15

Hoagland also bases her argument on her reading of Robertson v. Wegmann, 436 U.S.
584 (1978).

This is problematic for at least two (2) reasons.

First, in Robertson, the U.S.

Supreme Court stated, "We intimate no view, moreover, about whether abatement based on state
law could be allowed in a situation in which deprivation of federal rights caused death." Id. at
594. As such, the U.S. Supreme Court noted the specific issue (which is the issue in the current
controversy) was not before them and they would not rule on it. Therefore, there is nothing in

Robertson that precludes a state's survivorship law from abating a § 1983 action.
Second, and more importantly, applying the U.S. Supreme Court's analysis in Robertson
to a situation in which the alleged "deprivation of federal rights caused death" leads to the
conclusion that abatement based on Idaho law would be allowed.

The § 1983 survivorship

analysis set forth in Robertson is as follows:
When federal law is thus "deficient," § 1988 instructs us to turn to "the common
law, as modified and changed by the constitution and statutes 0 f the [forum]
State," as long as these are "not inconsistent with the Constitution and laws of the
United States."

Jd. at 588 (citations omitted). Thus, if federal law is insufficient courts rely on the law of the
forum state. "[O]ne specific area not covered by federal law is that relating to 'the survival of
civil rights actions under § 1983 upon the death of either the plaintiff or defendant. '" Id. at 589
(citations omitted). Therefore, the laws of the forum state govern.! 0

!O The Robertson Court continued, "Despite the broad sweep of § 1983, we can find nothing in
the statute or its underlying policies to indicate that a state law causing abatement of a particular
action should invariably be ignored in favor of a rule of absolute survivorship." Id. at 590.
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Even if the forum state's laws would cause abatement of the § 1983 claims, such
abatement laws are still applicable.
A state statute cannot be considered "inconsistent" with federal law merely
because the statute causes the plaintiff to lose the litigation. If success of the
§ 1983 action were the only benchmark, there would be no reason at all to look to
state law, for the appropriate rule would then always be one favoring the plaintiff,
and its source would be essentially irrelevant.

Id. at 593. Thus, abatement of the § 1983 cause of action is not inconsistent with federal law. II
The Robertson Court used this analysis to conclude that the § 1983 action in that case
should be dismissed pursuant to Louisiana's survivorship statute. Applying the same analysis to
the case at bar reaches the same result. "The common law has not been modified or changed in
Idaho either by statute or the Constitution, and therefore the general common law rule that
personal causes of action do not survive the death of the injured party is the rule in Idaho."

Evans, 118 Idaho at 217, 796 P .2d at 94 (citation omitted); see also, Doe v. Cutter Biological,
Inc., 89 F.3d 844, 1996 WL 344615 *4 (9th Cir. 1996) (unpublished); Craig v. Gellings, 148
Idaho 192, 194, 219 P.3d 1208, 1210 (Ct.App. 2009) (Unmarried plaintiffs personal injury
claims abate upon death). Applying Idaho's survivorship law results in abatement of any § 1983
claim that could be brought by Munroe and/or his Estate.
Thus, even if one could somehow argue that the holding in Evans was being read too
broadly,12 the simple fact of the matter is that the combination of the U.S. Supreme Court's

This also nullifies any public policy argument that application of the proper Idaho legal
standard would undermine the purpose of § 1983. Hoagland appears to miss the point that
though Idaho law precludes § 1983 claims by an estate in a situation like this, it does provide for
other remedies through state tort claims that would deter misconduct by a potential wrongdoer.
II
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analysis on abatement of § 1983 claims with Idaho's survivorship laws leads to the inescapable
conclusion that the Estate cannot bring a § 1983 action in Idaho.
4.

Hoagland Has Misconstrued Statutorv Authority.

Hoagland forwards that Idaho Code § 5-327 (regarding survival of actions) provides a
basis for the Estate to bring a § 1983 claim. l3

Appellant's Brief, p. 68.

However, recent

amendments to this statute demonstrate that in situations such as the current litigation, the Idaho
Legislature has reasserted that the non-survivability of personal causes of action is still the rule
in Idaho. In July of 2010, this statute was amended to add a new provision, which provides in
pertinent part:
(2) A cause of action for personal injury or property damage caused by the
wrongful act or negligence of another shall not abate upon the death of the injured
person from causes not related to the wrongful act or negligence ....
Hoagland cites to a number of cases outside of Idaho's jurisdiction in support of her
contention. Appellant's Brief, p. 56, n. 246. However, at least two (2) of these cases are not §
1983 cases and do not apply because they are not subject to § 1988, Idaho law, or the analysis set
forth in Robertson (see Carlson v. Green, 446 U.S. 14 (1980) (a Bivens case) and In re Estate of
Ferdinand Marcos, Human Rights Litigation, 25 F.3d 1467 (9 th Cir. 1994) (a cause of action
arising under the Alien Tort Act». The remaining cases are also inapplicable because they fail to
factor in Idaho's survivability laws. Hoagland has failed to point to a single § 1983 case in Idaho
that stands for the proposition she suggests.
13 It appears Hoagland has confused wrongful death claims under Idaho law with survivability of
personal causes of action upon death. Appellant's Brief, p. 54. These are separate and distinct
claims. See Doe at *2. Idaho Code § 5-311 creates a new cause of action (wrongful death) for
the benefit of an heir, but this is not the same as survivorship of a personal cause of action. By
its very nature, a wrongful death claim does not survive the decedent since it cannot come into
existence until the decedent's death. Survivorship, on the other hand, is reflected by Idaho Code
§ 5-327, which allows (i) most personal causes of action to survive the death of the tortfeasor,
and (ii) personal causes of action that are not related to the death of the injured party to survive
the injured party's death. The viability of an estate's § 1983 claim is dependent upon the forum
state's survivability law (i.e. Idaho Code § 5-327), not wrongful death law, as Hoagland seems to
suggest.
12
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Idaho Code § 5-327 (emphasis added).
Prior to the recent adoption of this provision, Idaho followed the general common law
rule that personal causes of action do not survive the death of the injured party. See, Section
III.A.2 above. The Legislature has now carved out an exception for situations in which the death
is unrelated to the cause of action. By making such an exception, and not including situations in
which the death is related to the cause of action, the 2010 Legislature confirmed that a personal
claim based on actions resulting in the death of the injured party is abated under Idaho law. 14
Despite the above, Hoagland asks this Court to ignore Idaho legislative intent,
Congressional intent and U.S. Supreme Court decisions and allow her to bring her case under
§ 1983.

However, it was Hoagland's choice not to utilize Idaho's wrongful death statute.

Having dismissed the state remedy, Hoagland now urges this Court to expand claims actionable
under § 1983. In other words, she is advocating constitutionalizing state torts. This request is
hardly novel. In fact, it is the very practice the U.S. Supreme Court and lower courts strive to
prohibit.

15

The fact that Idaho provides a wrongful death remedy is why Idaho has not frustrated

Andrews v. Neer, 253 F.3d 1052 (8 th Cir. 2001), further emphasizes this point. In that case, the
Eighth Circuit was faced with a similar statutory scheme (in Missouri) allowing personal claims
not resulting in death to survive, but abating such claims when they resulted in death. The court
noted that if the estate of the decedent had attempted to bring a § 1983 claim, it would not have
standing to pursue such claims because Missouri's survival statutes did not provide for such
recovery. Id. at 1057.
15 The U.S. Supreme Court has rejected reasoning that, "would make of the Fourteenth
Amendment a font of tort law to be superimposed upon whatever systems may already be
administered by the States. '" Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. 693, 701 (1976). "Affording plaintiffs a
constitutional due process right to recover against the state in these circumstances would create
the risk of constitutionalizing all torts against individuals who happen to have families." Russ v.
Watts, 414 F.3d 783,790 (7th Cir. 2005).
14
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§ 1983. The legislature has provided a remedy - a state wrongful death act. The Estate chose to
abandon that avenue and now urges this Court to adopt a course contrary to settled § 1983 law.
In light of the above, Hoagland has no basis to argue that the Estate can bring a § 1983
claim in Idaho, as already demonstrated by this Court, an Idaho federal district court, application
of the U.S. Supreme Court's § 1983 survivability analysis, and the Idaho Legislature. Therefore,
the dismissal of the Estate by the District Court should stand on appeal.
B.

The District Court Properly Granted James Johnson Qualified Immunity.16

Even if this Court finds that one or both of the Plaintiffs have standing to sue the
Defendants, the District Court's dismissal of Johnson based on qualified immunity was correct.
As argued below, the Defendants assert that the law regarding a jail's constitutional mandate
with regard to a potentially suicidal inmate is not clearly established, but even if this Court finds
that it is, Johnson did not violate Munroe or Hoagland's constitutional rights.

Johnson is

therefore entitled to qualified immunity, as granted by the District Court.
1.

Standard of Review. 17

The District Court granted Johnson qualified immunity based on the Defendants' Motion
for Reconsideration. "The decision to grant or deny a request for reconsideration generally rests
in the sound discretion of the trial court." Jordan v. Beeks, 135 Idaho 586,592,21 P.3d 908, 914

16 The Defendants raised the defense of qualified immunity for all of the individually named
Defendants. However, the District Court only specifically conducted the qualified immunity
analysis (and subsequently granted the immunity) for one Defendant James Johnson.
17 This same standard also applies to this Court's review of the granting of summary judgment to
Wroblewski (Section m.c below), Pape (Section III.D below) and Ada County (Section m.E
below). In the interest of brevity, the standard will not be repeated in those sections.
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(2001). However, since Hoagland's appeal challenges the District Court's legal conclusions and
not the actual granting of the Motion for Reconsideration, the Defendants submit that the
summary judgment standard of review is appropriate. See, Steel Farms, Inc. v. Croft & Reed,

Inc., 2012 WL 246678 (Idaho).
When reviewing a district court's ruling on a summary judgment motion, this Court
applies the same standard used by the district court. Miller v. Idaho State Patrol, 150 Idaho 856,
863,252 P.3d 1274,1281 (2011) (citations omitted). Summary judgment is appropriate "if the
pleadings, depositions, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that
there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a
judgment as a matter of law." I.R.C.P. 56(c). Disputed facts and reasonable inferences are
construed in favor of the non-moving party. Estate

0/ Becker v.

Callahan, 140 Idaho 522, 525,

96 P.3d 623, 626 (2004). "If there is no genuine issue of material fact, only a question of law
remains, over which this COUl1 exercises free review." Indian Springs LLC v. Indian Springs

Land Inv., 147 Idaho 737, 746, 215 P.3d 457,466 (2009) (citations omitted).
2.

The General Qualified Immunity Analysis. IS

As this Court is aware, qualified immunity immunizes "all but the plainly incompetent or
those who knowingly violate the law." Malley v. Briggs, 475 U.S. 335, 341 (1986). Recently,
the U.S. Supreme Court reiterated the underlying rationale:
Qualified immunity balances two important interests-the need to hold public
officials accountable when they exercise power irresponsibly and the need to
"The contours of qualified immunity are the same under both Idaho and Federal law." Nation
v. State, Dept. a/Correction, 144 Idaho 177, 186, 158 P.3d 953, 962 (2007).
18
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shield officials from harassment, distraction, and liability when they perform their
duties reasonably. The protection of qualified immunity applies regardless of
whether the government official's error is "a mistake of law, a mistake of fact, or a
mistake based on mixed questions of law and fac1."

Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 231 (2009) (citations omitted).
Because qualified immunity "is an immunity from suit rather than a mere defense to
liability ... it is effectively lost if a case is erroneously permitted to go to trial." Mitchell v.

Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511,526 (1985) (emphasis deleted).
These remarks are further echoed by other U.S. Supreme Court cases finding that under
qualified immunity, an official will be protected from suit when he or "she makes a decision that,
even

if constitutionally

deficient,

reasonably

misapprehends

the

law

governing the

circumstances .... " Brosseau v. Haugen, 543 U.S. 194, 198 (2004); see also, Saucier v. Katz,
533 U.S. 194, 206 (2001).

The standard is an objective one that leaves "ample room for

mistaken jUdgments ... " Malley, 475 U.S. at 343.
As this Court has held, when a court is presented with a qualified immunity defense, the
central questions are: "(1) whether, accepting the plaintiff s assertions as true,19 the defendant
invaded the plaintiffs constitutional rights; and (2) whether the defendant acted reasonably given
the state of American law at the time." Miller, 150 Idaho at 864, 252 P.3d at 1282. In other
words, regarding the second question, was the right at issue "clearly established," and was the
19 Hoagland invites this Court to overrule that portion of Nation that states, "taken in the light
most favorable to the party asserting immunity." Appellant's Brief, p. 45. However, this Court
in Miller held that the plaintiffs assertions must be accepted as true. Miller, 150 Idaho at 865,
252 P.3d at 1283. Accordingly, and contrary to Hoagland's contention, the District Court
consistently viewed the facts in the light most favorable to Hoagland. See, R. p. 2329; R. p.
350l.
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conduct of the party claiming qualified immunity reasonable? Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. at 201-

06; see also, Nation, 144 Idaho at 187, 158 P.3d at 963. A § 1983 plaintiff has the burden to
prove these steps before his or her case proceeds. Miller, 150 Idaho at 865, 252 P.3d at 1283.
As a result of the decision in Pearson, courts now have the discretion to decide the order
of the steps - that is - courts are now permitted to skip the first step and directly answer whether
the right was clearly established without first determining whether a constitutional violation
occurred. Pearson, 555 U.S. at 241-242; see also, Miller, 150 Idaho at 864, 252 P.3d at 1282.
This Court followed that path in Miller v. Idaho State Patrol, and also followed the rule
of constitutional avoidance when deciding not to answer the constitutional question in that case.
These are the paths that should be followed in this case as well.
3.

In

As It Did in Miller v. Idaho State Patrol, This Court Should Follow the General
Rule of Constitutional Avoidance and Decline to Rule on the Issue of Whether
Johnson Violated Munroe's Constitutional Rights.
~Miller

(a § 1983 case decided less than one (1) year ago), this Court conducted a

thoughtful analysis as to why, under the guidance of Pearson, it declined to rule on whether the
act of forced catheterization violated the plaintiff's Fourth Amendment rights. See, Miller, 150
Idaho at 864-65,252 P.3d at 1282-1283. Instead, this Court determined that Christopher Yount,
the Idaho State trooper who instructed a hospital worker to catheterize plaintiff Jason Miller after
his arrest for DUI, was entitled to qualified immunity as the law regarding forced
catheterizations was unsettled. Id. at 865-69, 1283-1287.
In reaching its determination, this Court held:

"Foremost among the reasons for

declining to adjudicate the Fourth Amendment question is the opportunity to avoid ruling on a
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constitutional issue. The general rule of constitutional avoidance encourages courts to interpret
statutes so as to avoid unnecessary constitutional questions.,,20

Jd. at 864, 1282 (citations

omitted). Furthermore, this Court held that when following this general rule, an appellate court:
need not consider the correctness of the plaintiff s version of the facts, nor even
determine whether the plaintiffs allegations actually state a claim. All it need
determine is a question of law: whether the legal norms allegedly violated by the
defendant were clearly established at the time of the challenged actions.
Jd. at 865, 1283 (citing Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. at 528).

Along these same lines, in the recent case of Ashcroft v. al-Kidd, 131 S.Ct. 2074 (2011)
(a § 1983 qualified immunity case), the U. S. Supreme Court instructed that, "[ c]ourts should
think carefully before expending 'scarce judicial resources' to resolve difficult and novel
questions of constitutional or statutory interpretation that will 'have no effect on the outcome of
the case. '" Jd. at 2080 (citations omitted).
As the District Court correctly held, the law in this case is not clearly established,
resulting in qualified immunity for Johnson.

Consequently, an analysis of whether Johnson

violated Munroe or Hoagland's constitutional rights will have "no effect on the outcome of the
case." This Court should therefore follow its analysis in Miller and skip the first prong of the
qualified immunity analysis and find (as the District Court did) that since the law in this case is
not clearly established,21 Johnson is entitled to qualified immunity.

20 Another factor in the decision not to rule on the constitutional issue was that the record in
Miller was extremely underdeveloped (unlike the case here), but that factor was "subsidiary" to
the rule of constitutional avoidance. Jd. at 864, 1282.
21 Equally applicable is this Court's recognition that the Miller case, "should not be decided
lightly." Miller, 150 Idaho at 864, 252 P.3d at 1282. This Court recognized that, "[p]rescribing
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4.

The District Court Was Correct in Holding That the Law in This Case Is Not
Clearly Established, Thus Entitling Johnson to Qualified Immunity.

The District Court made express findings when it granted Johnson qualified immunity which is (contrary to Hoagland's assertions) consistent with the law on qualified immunity:22
After considering all the evidence in the Record, the Court finds that Johnson
acted in an objectively legally reasonable manner when he incorrectly decided
that Bradley Munroe was not at imminent risk of suicide on September 29, 2008.
As the Court made clear in its January 20 Order, the standard to which Johnson is
held is deliberate indifference, not negligence. His incorrect, but thoughtful,
analysis is the sort of action that Qualified Immunity protects.
In summary, while the facts as Ms. Hoagland has alleged them may make out a
violation by Johnson of a constitutional right, the Court finds that a reasonable jail
social worker would not have thought he was acting with deliberate indifference
toward Munroe on September 29, 2008, by clearing Munroe from suicide watch,
and, therefore, the right Hoagland alleges was violated was not clearly established
at that time.
R. pp. 3498-3499. 23

methods the police may use to test for drugs or alcohol in the bloodstream would have a
significant impact on law enforcement agencies across the State, many of which are daily
encountering intoxicated drivers." Id. This very reasoning should be applied to the case at hand,
which also should not be decided lightly. Prescribing procedures for jail social workers to use
when assessing potentially suicidal inmates would have a significant impact on social workers
and jail medical units across the State, since suicide is such a common concern in jails. R. p.
2408 (45:9-18); R. p. 2409 (51:19-25,52:1-21). By deciding the constitutional question here,
this Court may be imposing its judgment on jail social workers which may chill their clinical
decision-making process out of fear of legal consequences (the very thing qualified immunity is
meant to prevent).
22 When reviewing the facts in this case, we enjoy the benefit of hindsight - a benefit Johnson
did not have.
23 When a trial court grants qualified immunity to a defendant, a finding that the facts as alleged
by a plaintiff may make out a violation of a constitutional right is not the same as a finding that
the defendant was deliberately indifferent to the plaintiff.
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As this Court is aware, a "[g]overnment official's conduct violates clearly established law
when, at the time of the challenged conduct, '[t]he contours of [a] right [are] sufficiently clear'
that every 'reasonable official would have understood that what he is doing violates that right.'"
al-Kidd, 131 S.Ct. at 2083. Whether the law is clearly established is a question of law to be

resolved de novo on appeal. Miller, 150 Idaho at 865, 252 P.3d 1283.
Importantly, "[t]he plaintiff has the burden of establishing that the law was wellestablished."

!d.

A plaintiff must point to either "cases of controlling authority in their

jurisdiction at the time of the incident" or to "a consensus of cases of persuasive authority such
that a reasonable officer could not havc believed that his actions were lawful." Wilson v. Layne,
526 U.S. 603,617 (1999).
Furthermore, the constitutional right allegedly violated cannot be generally defined. As
the U.S. Supreme Court instructed, "We do not require a case directly on point, but existing
precedent must have placed the statutory or constitutional question beyond debate." al-Kidd,
131 S.Ct. at 2083. As this Court noted, "[t]he Court should not define the right too generally, as
doing so would essentially vitiate the qualified-immunity doctrine.,,24 Miller, 150 Idaho at 865,
252 P.3d at 1283 (citing Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 639 (1987».

24 For instance, in lv/iller, the plaintiff asserted that the appropriate legal question should be
whether the police can obtain bodily fluid from a person reasonably suspected of driving under
the influence of alcohol or drugs. Id. This Court, however, stated that such a question is not
helpful to the analysis and instead, "the question should reflect the factual specifics in [the]
case." Id. at 866-67, 1283-84. Ultimately, this Court defined the legal question in that case as:
"Would a reasonable police officer know that as of May 2007, it was unlawful to involuntarily
catheterize a suspect based on probable cause to search for dissipating evidence even if lessintrusive alternatives are available?" Id. at 866, 1284.
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In the context of the legal questions in this case, Hoagland has defined the allegedly
violated rights of Mumoe and herself too generally. In light of the case law discussed above,
particularly from this Court, the legal questions must be factually specific to this case.
Otherwise, the purpose of qualified immunity is abated.
a.

Hoagland Defines the Allegedly Violated Rights of Munroe and Herself
Too Generallv.

Contrary to case law, Hoagland defines the allegedly violated rights too generally.
Regarding Mumoe's rights, she defines the legal question as:
The contours of Bradley's right to health and safety were well established by
many cases holding that ajailer violates a detainee's constitutional rights when he
knows the detainee faces a substantial risk of self-harm and disregards that risk by
25
failing to take reasonable steps to prevent the harm.
Appellant's Brief, p. 39.
While following this Court's guidance in l\filler, the Defendants submit that the more
appropriate and fact-specific legal question regarding Munroe's rights is as follows:
Whether a reasonable jail social worker placed in Johnson's shoes on September
29, 2008, would have known he was acting with deliberate indifference to
Mumoe's constitutional right to adequate mental healthcare if that hypothetical
jail social worker allowed placement of Munroe in general population housing
after reviewing his previous assessment of Munroe, collecting data, studying his
interactions with deputies, and speaking with and assessing him again.
Regarding her own rights,26 Hoagland again defines them too broadly:

Elsewhere in the Appellant's Brief Hoagland refers to "the right to reasonably adequate
healthcare and safety" as being clearly established in 2008. Appellant's Brief, p. 58. Again, this
is too general and not helpful to the analysis.
26 In this case, the parties are faced with the unique situation in which the District Court
determined for the first time under Idaho law that a parent of an adult child can bring a § 1983
25
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The contours of Ms. Hoagland's rights in her familial relationship with her son
were sufficiently established by the existence of numerous cases where parents of
adult children, and other similar familial relationships, were found to have had a
constitutionally protected familial interest that was invaded by ajailer's deliberate
indifference toward a prisoner. 27
Appellant's Brief, p. 41.
While the District Court did not address qualified immunity in terms of Hoagland's own
rights, the Defendants assert that the appropriate legal question is as follows:
Whether a reasonable jail social worker placed in lohnson's shoes on September
29, 2008, would have known he was intentionally violating Hoagland's right to a
familial relationship with her adult son if that social worker allowed placement of
that son in the general jail population after having reviewed his previous
assessment of the son, collected further information about the son, observed the
son's interactions with deputies, and having spoken with and assessed the son.

wrongful death claim. In arriving at that conclusion, the District Court stated that it "now holds
the appropriate analysis of Idaho wrongful death claims in a § 1983 context is that followed by
the Fifth Circuit in Rhyne v. Henderson [County, 973 F.2d 386 (5 th Cir. 1992)]. ... " R. p. 1585.
The Rhyne court held that § 1988 could be used to incorporate Texas' wrongful death remedy
into a § 1983 claim, allowing a mother to recover for "her injury caused by the state's
deprivation of her son's constitutionally secured liberty interest." Rhyne, 973 F.2d at 391
(emphasis added). If the mother in Rhyne was allowed to incorporate Texas' wrongful death
statute (which created a new cause of action in favor of the mother) into § 1988, then it follows
that the resulting § 1983 substantive due process cause of action would similarly be specific to
the mother based on her substantive due process rights, and not her son's. The Rhyne court
follows this path, but at the last minute adds the sentence "[t]o be more precise, our decisions
allow recovery by Rhyne for her injury caused by the state's deprivation of her son's
constitutionally secured liberty interests," which appears to contradict its own analysis. Id. As a
result, it is not clear whose constitutional rights are at issue. Is it the mother's substantive due
process liberty interest in maintaining a relationship with her son, or is it the son's due process
rights? If it is actually the mother's (which is more consistent with the Rhyne court's legal
analysis), then what are the contours of that right? Consequently, the Defendants will argue their
rosition regarding both Mumoe's and Hoagland's rights.
7 The Defendants disagree with Hoagland's assertion that this cause of action exists in the
United States. See Cross-Appellants' Brief, Section A, pp. 2-9.
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As argued below, Hoagland has not met her burden of proving that the law was clearly
established regarding Munroe's and her own rights. As such, and consistent with the District
Court's holding, Johnson is entitled to qualified immunity.

b.

Hoagland Cannot Meet Her Burden of Proving That the Law Was Clearlv
Established Regarding Either Munroe's or Hoagland's Rights.

As discussed above, it is not clear whose substantive constitutional rights are at issue.
Regardless, it is Hoagland's burden to establish that the law, as it existed in September 2008,
was clearly established.

Miller, 150 Idaho at 865, 252 P.3d at 1283.

As set forth below,

Hoagland cannot do so.

i.

The Law Was Not Clearly Established Regarding Munroe's
Constitutional Rights.

As for Munroe's constitutional rights, the U.S. Supreme Court has explained that in order
for an inmate to state a claim under § 1983 for denial of adequate medical treatment, the inmate
must allege acts or omissions sufficiently harmful to evidence deliberate indifference to serious
medical needs. Hudson v. McMillian, 503 U.S. 1, 5-9 (1992).
As there are no cases of controlling authority in Idaho regarding a jail social worker
clearing an adult inmate from suicide watch, Hoagland must be able to point to "a consensus of
cases of persuasive authority" such that a reasonable jail social worker could not have believed
that his actions were lawful. As is clear from the Appellant's Brief, Hoagland cannot do so,
since no such consensus exists. This is because jail suicide cases are regularly dismissed.
For example, in Rhyne, a deputy jailer found an inmate hanging semi-conscious in his
cell from a make-shift rope fashioned from his blanket.
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Rhyne, 973 F.2d at 388. After the

inmate returned to the jail from the hospital the next day, he again attempted to hang himself
with his straight jacket. !d.

The inmate was then seen by a mental health worker from the

outside (the jail had none on staff) who advised he be committed for psychological evaluation.

Id. at 389. Due to issues regarding legal authority over pretrial detainees, the inmate was not
transferred. Id. Instead, he was placed (with a blanket) into a cell which could not be clearly
monitored. Id. Later that day, the inmate's mother and sister visited and the inmate told them he
would try to kill himself again. Id. The mother then contacted the jail about transferring her son
to a hospital, but was told to contact a judge. Id.

The mother and the inmate's sister claimed

they informed jail staff of the inmate's repeated threat to kill himself. Id. That evening, the
inmate hanged himself with a strip of his blanket and eventually died. Id. When the mother later
sued under § 1983, the court dismissed the matter at summary judgment, determining that the
facts of the case did not rise to the level of § 1983 liability. Id. at 393.
Similarly, in Minix v. Canarecci, 597 F.3d 824, 828

(7th

Cir. 2010),28 a mental health

patient with a history of suicidal tendencies was arrested on charges of theft and battery after he
became separated from his family, who had temporarily checked him out of the State hospital.
During booking, jail staff noticed scars on his wrist and neck and the inmate admitted to
attempting suicide in the previous month.

Id.

A few days later (after having initially been

placed on suicide watch), a mental health worker who had experience, but no formal licensure,
visited the inmate. Id. The mental health worker did not review the inmate's medical chart and

Although arising after Munroe's death, this case reflects that even after 2008, such cases are
regularly dismissed.

28
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did not speak to deputies about the inmate's condition, but issued a brief report noting the inmate
denied suicidal thoughts. Id. The inmate was then taken off suicide watch. Id. Thirty days
later, the inmate refused his medication and a blade was noted to be missing from his razor. Id.
He was temporarily placed on suicide watch and then transferred to disciplinary segregation. Id.
at 828-29. At 4 p.m. the inmate was checked in his cell and then, during the next check at 11
p.m. (seven (7) hours later), the inmate was found hanging from his bed sheet. Id. at 829. The
inmate's mother subsequently brought a § 1983 case, criticizing the actions of the jail and
specifically claiming that the mental health worker's assessment was inadequate. Id. at 83l.
Again, however, the court determined that pursuant to § 1983 law the facts alleged were
insufficient to support the § 1983 claims. Id.
Also helpful is the Sixth Circuit's analysis in Perez v. Oakland County, 466 F.3d 416 (6 th
Cir. 2006), a § 1983 jail suicide case in which the court held that inmate caseworker Roberta
Rice was "entitled to qualified immunity because no law exists that would clearly establish for a
person in Rice's position that she was violating [the deceased inmate's] Eighth Amendment
rights." Id. at 428. Inmate Perez attempted suicide in the jail on November 22, 2002, and died
four (4) days later from his injuries. Perez had a history of incarcerations at the jail, and had
multiple contacts with Rice during those times.

In 2001, Rice ordered that Perez receive a

psychiatric evaluation, resulting a diagnosis of schizo affective disorder. Perez, who had also
been diagnosed with ADHD and as being learning disabled, had a history of experiencing
hallucinations, hearing voices and of considering suicide, which he attempted in the jail on
October 25, 2002. On November 18, 2002, Perez met with Rice after a deputy requested that
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Perez be housed in a single cell as he had been stealing from other inmates in his 10-man cell.
Perez told Rice that he was no longer taking his medications, since he believed he did not need
them. Rice found that Perez's "insight appears limited" and "judgment appears poor" but that he
was stable and did not seem to be suicidal and could be housed in a single cell with no
supervision. Id. at 422. Four (4) days later, Perez was found hanging from his bed sheet.
In reaching its decision that the law was not clearly established, the Perez court held that
even though the general proposition that an official cannot be deliberately indifferent to the
serious medical needs of an inmate is well-established, that general proposition is not enough, on
its own, "to alert a reasonable caseworker that Rice's conduct was deliberately indifferent under
the circumstances." Id. at 428. The court went on to note that, "[b]ecause most legal rights are
'clearly established' at some level of generality, immunity would be impossible to obtain if a
plaintiff were required only to cite an abstract legal principle that an official had 'clearly'
violated.,,29 Id. (citations omitted).
The difficulty in utilizing § 1983 in the context of jail suicide is also demonstrated by the
Ninth Circuit in Simmons v. Navajo County, 609 F.3d 1011 (9 th Cir. 2010), where the parents of
29 The Perez court also noted that it had previously held that once an inmate is deemed suicidal,
it is clearly established that the inmate is entitled to continuing medical treatment. Id. at 428.
However, the court held, because Perez was not deemed to be suicidal by Rice when he was
moved to a single cell, the law was not clearly established. Id. Such is the case here. Munroe
was not deemed to be suicidal by Johnson after his assessment on September 29, 2008. R. p.
2539 (246:17-25); R. p. 2522 (181:7-18). Therefore, the law was not clearly established. The
Perez court also emphasized that Perez "was not generally deprived of medical treatment
involving his mental health needs." Perez, 466 F.3d at 428-29. Hoagland does not argue (and
there is nothing in the Record that would support such an argument) that Munroe was "generally
deprived of medical treatment involving his mental health needs," since he was seen by a mental
health professional.
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a seventeen (17) year-old pretrial detainee, who committed suicide, were not allowed to continue
their § 1983 litigation against a variety of jail staff, their supervisors, and the County. As stressed
by the Ninth Circuit, "[0 ]nce a suicide has been accomplished in spite of preventative measures,
it is all too easy to point out the flaws of fail ure." Id. at 1020.
In support of her contention that Monroe's rights were clearly established, Hoagland cites
to Comstock v. McCrary, 273 F.3d 693 (6 th Cir. 2001).

However, that case is easily

distinguished. 30 In Comstock, a prison psychologist removed an inmate from close observation
and sent him back to his cell without reviewing a battery of psychological tests administered a
few days prior to the inmate's suicide (Monroe did not have such tests), without reviewing
medical records (Johnson did review Munroe's medical records, which included an earlier
assessment by Johnson and a thirty (30) day stay with no concerns raised), without speaking to
the resident officer who referred the inmate for a psychological consultation (Johnson did speak
to Wroblewski and the classification deputy), without speaking to the prison guards who daily
checked on the inmate (Monroe had just arrived at the Jail), without reviewing log entries
concerning threats against the inmate (Monroe did not have such entries), and without speaking
to two (2) other psychologists who had met with the inmate (Johnson, the only social worker
who had met with Monroe, assessed him twice within the last two (2) months».

The

psychologist testified that had he reviewed the above documents and spoken with the deputies

Noteworthy is that Comstock and Perez, supra, both from the Sixth Circuit, have different
outcomes. The Perez court granted qualified immunity (a more recent case than Comstock) and
the Comstock court denied it
further emphasizing that the law is not clearly established
regarding the suicide assessments of inmates.
30
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and psychologists, he would have learned more information about the inmate and would not have
removed him from close observational status and would have determined that he was a suicide
threat. Id. at 707. The Comstock court was particularly troubled that the psychologist did not
review the inmate's medical file. 3 ! Here, though, Johnson (who had met with Monroe the month
before) did review his medical record before meeting with him on September 29, 2008. R. p.
137,' 17; R. p. 2509 (126:19-25); R. p. 2535 (230:8-25). And, importantly, Johnson testified
that even if he had known that Monroe would be placed in a cell alone, he would not have
changed his assessment. R. p. 2539 (246:22-25, 247: 1-4).
As the discussion above shows, suicide cases are dismissed regularly. At the very least,
though, a review of the suicide cases cited by both the parties shows different courts (sometimes
in the same Circuit) reaching different outcomes based on the unique facts presented to them. As
this Court noted in Miller,
[i]t is difficult enough to expect a reasonable police officer to differentiate
between cases in which officers were allowed to hold down a suspect at the
border and search his rectal cavity for heroin ... or a case in which police were
allowed to pump a suspect's stomach after he admitted swallowing crack cocaine
on a public street. .. from a case wherein officers could not pump a suspect's
stomach to retrieve two suspicious capsules he swallowed in front of them during
an illegal home search ....
l'11iller, 150 Idaho at 868,252 P.3d at 1286 (citations omitted).

The same analysis is applicable here. It would be quite difficult to expect a reasonable
jail social worker to differentiate between suicide cases where sometimes qualified immunity
Contrast the Comstock court's denial of qualified immunity based on a failure to review
medical files with the Minix court's granting of qualified immunity to a mental health worker
who also failed to review medical files.
3!
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was granted and sometimes it was not, particularly when a federal Circuit appellate court
specifically finds that the law is not clearly established. As in Miller, the law regarding suicide
assessments by jail social workers "is too undeveloped, and the applicable legal principles too
uncertain," to hold Johnson personally liable in this case. ld. 869, 1287. Since the law was not
clearly established, Johnson's dismissal based on qualified immunity should be upheld.
ii.

The Law Was Not Clearly Established Regarding Hoagland's
Constitutional Rights.

If this Court determines that the focus should be on the violation of Hoagland's own
rights instead of Munroe's, the law is still not clearly established. The act of creating a new
constitutional right in Hoagland's favor provides qualified immunity protection to Johnson, since
Hoagland must not only demonstrate that a constitutional right was violated, but that the right in
question was "clearly established" by applicable law prior to the defendant's actions.

See,

Mueller v. Auker, 576 F.3d 979, 993 (9 th Cir. 2009). Logic dictates that a right cannot have been

"clearly established" regarding Hoagland's own rights if the cause of action was just created.
Hoagland argues that Johnson was on notice that he could be sued under § 1983 by
Munroe's heirs, and cites Strandberg v. City of Helena, 791 F.2d 744 (9 th Cir. 1986) in support
of this contention. 32 However, this case does not stand for that proposition. In Strandberg, the
parents of their adult child who killed himself in jail mistakenly thought that the trial court
dismissed them as parties, and thus appealed that decision. ld. at 748. The Ninth Circuit found
that while the trial court did dismiss the Strandberg's "right to parent" claim (since their child
The Defendants contend that this cause of action is no longer valid in the United States. See
Cross-Appellants' Brief, Section A, pp. 2-9.

32

RESPONDENTS' BRIEF - PAGE 35

was an adult), the trial court did not dismiss their Fourteenth Amendment claim regarding a right
to companionship and society, resulting in the Strandbergs remaining as parties to the action.
The Ninth Circuit did not discuss the merits of that claim.
Hoagland also references Idaho Code §§ 5-311, 5-327 and 15-1-201 as putting Johnson
on notice that he could be sued by a parent for his conduct. Appellant's Brief, p. 42. However,
these statutes pertain to \vrongful death and negligence causes of action brought under state law,
and certainly would not give anyone notice that his or her actions toward an adult could
constitute a § 1983 constitutional violation of the rights of that adult's parent.
Johnson's dismissal was therefore correct, as the constitutional rights at stake are not only
unclear, but also the law regarding such rights is not clearly established. Johnson could not have
been on notice that his thoughtful assessment of Munroe would somehow violate Hoagland's
constitutional rights.

However, even if this Court finds that the applicable law was clearly

established regarding Munroe or Hoagland's rights,33 Johnson is still entitled to qualified
immunity, as he did not act with deliberate indifference towards Munroe when he conducted a
suicide assessment and determined, after thoughtful consideration, that Munroe was not at
imminent risk for suicide.

33 If this Court finds that the law was clearly established regarding Hoagland's rights, Johnson
still could not have violated Hoagland's constitutional rights, since it is unclear what standard
would be applied in making this determination it would, however, be a standard other than
deliberate indifference. The Defendants therefore are not in a position to conduct an analysis
regarding whether Johnson violated Hoagland's constitutional rights.

RESPONDENTS' BRIEF

PAGE 36

iii.

If This Court Finds That the Law Was Clearly Established, Johnson
Did Not Act With Deliberate Indifference Towards A1unroe.

When Munroe committed suicide, he was a pretrial detainee. 34 To state a constitutional
claim regarding medical care, an inmate (or pretrial detainee) must show that a jail official's
"acts or omissions [were] sufficiently harmful to evidence deliberate indifference to serious
medical needs." Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 106 (1976). A jail official cannot be liable for
deliberate indifference to an inmate's serious medical needs unless the official "knows of and
disregards an excessive risk to inmate health or safety; the official must both be aware of facts
from which the inference could be drawn that a substantial risk of serious harm exists, and he
must also draw the inference." Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 837(1994). "If a [jail official]
should have been aware of the risk, but was not, then the [official] has not violated the Eighth
Amendment, no matter how severe the risk." Toguchi v. Chung, 391 F.3d 1051, 1057 (9 th Cir.
2004) (citations omitted) (emphasis added).
"[A] plaintiffs showing of nothing more than 'a difference of medical opinion' as to the
need to pursue one course of treatment over another [is] insufficient, as a matter of law, to
establish deliberate indifference."
(citations omitted).

Jackson v. McIntosh, 90 F.3d 330, 332 (9

th

Cir. 1996)

Furthermore, '" [m Jere negligence in diagnosing or treating a medical

The Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause, rather than the Eighth Amendment's
protection against cruel and unusual punishment, generally applies to pretrial detainees in county
jails. Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 537 n. 16 (1979). However, the same standards are applied
in both instances. Simmons, 609 F.3d at 1017.
34
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condition, without more, does not violate a prisoner's Eighth Amendment rights.'" Toguchi,391
F.3d at 1057 (citations omitted).
Specifically in jail suicide cases, deliberate indifference requires the plaintiff to show
"that the defendant: (1) subjectively knew the prisoner was at substantial risk of committing
suicide and (2) intentionally disregarded the risk." Minix, 597 F.3d at 831 (citations omitted).
The defendant must have had actual knowledge of the significant likelihood that the deceased
would take his life. Id. at 832. It is not enough that there was a danger that the official, "should

have been aware, rather, the official must both be aware of a set of facts from which the
substantial risk of serious harm may be drawn, and he must also draw that inference." Id. at
831-32 (emphasis added).

Further, there is no right to be screened correctly for suicidal

tendencies. Comstock, 273 F.3d at 702.
Therefore, in order for Hoagland to prove that Johnson was deliberately indifferent
towards Munroe, she must show that Johnson was subjectively aware that Munroe would likely

commit suicide and that he was intentionally indifferent to this outcome.

Hoagland can do

neither, as the Record is void of any such evidence, as recognized by the District Court. 35
When reviewing the Record it is helpful to examine three (3) main areas of significanceJohnson's actual assessment of Munroe on September 29, 2008, Munroe's PC request that
One of the most important considerations to keep in mind when reviewing immunity cases is
that these cases cannot be analyzed with the luxury of hindsight. The parties and this Court
know that Munroe took his life on September 29,2008. Looking backward from September 29,
2008 to every action and interaction between Johnson and Munroe is a natural response. But
being aware of Munroe's eventual actions makes us omnipotent in hindsight. Analyzing the
facts of this matter in that light is not fair since Johnson did not have our after-acquired
knowledge.
35
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resulted in his housing in Cellblock 7, and Hoagland's phone call to the Jail. It is also helpful to
review the Defendants' expert witnesses testimony, as well as Hoagland's own expert.
a)

Johnson's Assessment of Munroe.

Johnson had the opportunity to assess Munroe twice while at the Jail -- once on
September 1, 2008, and again on September 29, 2008. During his deposition, Johnson testified
at length about the September 29,2008 assessment, describing it in great detail:
You know, that morning, clearly, they had called specifically about suicide. So,
you know, the idea is: Here you have a guy who you've seen before, who you
knew to be taking medicine, knew to have a number of the risk factors which
we'd talked about. So that's kind of in your head.
But so I just went in, kind of watched. And he was cooperating, and talking to
them, and just sort of going through the motions fairly well with -- you know,
there's a lot of structure to that process itself, deputies giving him directions
about, you know, right finger, two fingers, four fingers, thumb, you know, that
kind of stuff you do on live scan-in?
So, obviously, clearly able to follow directions and do what he's told .... So, yep,
he can handle that pretty well. And so, you know - and so I just kind of walk up
then and talk to - and greet him, talk to him.
The ultimate point is: Let's make some kind of assessment of whether this guy
looks like imminent suicide risk. He's a troubled kid, he's had treatment. Let's
see what we need to do now.
Because there's a few things that happen. In the mental health treatment setting,
in the medical infirmary, you, essentially -- when you go on suicide status, you,
essentially, lose everything.
You don't get a chance to talk to people, you don't get a chance to move around.
You don't get a chance to wear clothes, initially, usually, if you're on the yellow
suicide status, which is our sort of highest-level suicide watch. You don't have
any element of normalcy.
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So the question is: Here's this troubled young kid, with reasonable social skills.
And most people, in most environments, obviously, aren't going to want to - even
though sometimes you have to put them there -- be in a situation where they don't
have easy access to phone when they want it, they don't get to eat food in a
normal service, they don't get to wear clothes, they don't get to move around the
dorm or holding-tank setting very well, there's no playing cards, there's no
talking, there's no whatever, you're just stuck in a room by yourself, which can
be isolating and difficult.
So do you want -let's go in and see ifhe looks like he's in a place where he can
interact with people, he's -- you know, where is he in terms of his level of
desperation, level of despondency, his ability to commit to being safe and okay in
the jail. So that's all kind of in the background of your head.
So, you know, I just came in, tried to open up conversation with him. He was
pleasant enough, in that he looked over at me, he did his tasks, and would look
and was talking for those for just a brief amount of minutes. And it's like,
"Well, that was when I came in, but you know, and I was being stupid. But
right now, I - you know, I'm not suicidal. I don't really have any need for mental
health services.,,36
So you can't just walk away, without trying to figure out: Okay, so there's a little
push away. It's a -- but I'm not going to let myself get disarmed by this. Let's see
if there's something else, some other way I might, through my own body
language, relaxation or -- you know, not getting sort of thwarted by my own
initial rejection, some way to help me engage and talk about a little bit more.
So probably, again, some efforts at, you know, "You were here last time. We
talked a little bit about medications. If you're going to be in the jail for awhile-"
you know, these are -- this is my supposition about kind of knowing, myself, if a
19-year-old kid's just kind of like, "Nope, don't need ya. I'm fine. I'm good,"
you know, sort of at least talking around, is there some way I can get him to think
- you know, "You were on medicines last time you were here. Are you going to
want to see the doctor or have us restart them? Or is there some way that we
could bring those, get those brought back in for you again?"

36 This is supported by Wroblewski's testimony regarding Johnson's assessment of Munroe:
"And I do remember that Mr. Munroe didn't really want to answer him and he told him, I don't
want your help. And then Jim Johnson said, okay, I'll respect your wishes. That's what I
remember." R. p. 3289 (34:3-10).
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And I, essentially, didn't get anywhere, not from the standpoint of him rejecting
me hostilely, but just - just sort of, you know, "No, I'm really not going to want
those services." So he sort of, kind of put it to an end.
During that time, any time that I'm talking, thinking, listening to his answers, I'm
just watching him ....
In spite of the fact that he had [been] pretty agitated, one might say, odd, difficult
behaviors the night before, and had a history that included a number of risk
factors for harming himself, he had a calm demeanor, was cooperative and
pleasant with deputies, even though, when he first came in the building, he
wasn't, Clearly, able to concentrate, look, listen, and respond in a respectful, kind
of calm tone, without being sort of sarcastic, and bad, nasty, rude, whatever, and
didn't look to be in any terrible distress.
And a question he's been asked before and knows sort of the outcome to, it's
clear, you know, "Well, then are you going to -" "So what you're telling me is
that you'll keep yourself safe while you're here in the jail? You can tell me that
you're going to do that?"
And, you know, looking right at me, he said, "Yeah. Yeah, that's not - I can do
that. "
But we were just talking directly to each other, he gave me sort of the verbal
assurance that, "Yeah, I'll keep myself safe in the jail. That's not the that's not
the thing at this point right now."
So I think about -- you know, I take that -- the risk factors, the history, those sorts
of things, into play, and look at the overall sort of calm, not irritated, agitated
demeanor, the consideration of how does somebody sort of integrate into the jail,
talk to some people they've seen there before, kind of hang out, pass time with
people .... You know, sort of how does he start to pull into jail. And does he look
like he's someone who can do that, is he -- sometimes we even put people in
medical just because they're like deer in the headlights, like "Ahhhhhhh," you
know, they've just never been in jail before and it's just the whole thing
overwhelms them, they don't know what to do.
He, clearly, looked quite comfortable, and was assuring for safety.
R. pp. 2521-2522 (174:4-25 -- 180:1-24).

RESPONDENTS' BRIEF -- PAGE 41

Based on this assessment (and with his twenty (20) years of experience), Johnson cleared
Mumoe for general housing. Johnson placed emphasis on the need for inmates to be able to
make choices about certain areas of their lives, which in a jail setting is limited to health care,
including mental health, and that inmates have the right to refuse mental health services or
treatment. R. p. 2494 (66:21-25, 67:1-4); R. p. 2503 (103:4-8).
Johnson was clear that after each of his interviews with Mumoe, he did not believe
Mumoe would harm himself.

Johnson's actions, chart notes, statements and testimony are

consistent with his belief that Mumoe was not likely to commit suicide on September 29,2008.
(1)

Hoagland Misrepresents Johnson's Testimony.

In the Appellant's Brief, Hoagland forwards that, "In explaining what he meant when he
used the specific term 'intent' in his documentation of his September 29, 2008 suicide
assessment of Bradley Mumoe, Johnson testified that he knew Bradley was planning and
wanting to hurt himself," and cites to several pages of Johnson's deposition transcript, focusing
on the words, "I know that this guy was planning and wanting to hurt himself." Appellant's
Brief, p. 49. Once again, Hoagland focuses on a few choice sentences taken out of context,
resulting in a complete misrepresentation of Johnson's actual testimony. The line of questioning
by Hoagland's counsel actually involved Johnson's understanding of Mumoe's past
hospitalization at Intermountain. Hoagland's counsel posed the question, "On the 29

th

,

when you

were done speaking with Bradley, was it your understanding that he'd been hospitalized at
Intermountain for making statements that he was going to commit suicide or an actual
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attempt?,,37 R. p. 2537 (240:14-17). The next two (2) pages of testimony consist of Johnson's
answer to that question, with Johnson explaining the meaning of the word "intent" in the context
of suicide, and that since he VvTote the word "intent," he knew Munroe had been serious in the

past regarding suicide. R. p. 2537 (240:21-25, 241:1-25, 242:1-7).
b)

Munroe's Protective Custody Request.

While being escorted to his cell after Johnson's assessment, Munroe told Deputy
Donelson that he was in danger in the Jail because people wanted to harm him. During his
deposition, Deputy Donelson testified that inmates frequently request protective custody - most
commonly because of danger to them from drug deals that have not gone well or because of their
gang affiliation -- without giving details. 38 R. p. 2445 (42:14-23).

It is important to note that neither Donelson nor classification deputy Drinkall testified
that Munroe was exhibiting "strange behavior," or that either of them had any "concern" about
Munroe's behavior.

Moreover, Donelson testified that Munroe was in good spirits when he

escorted him into Cellblock 7. R. p. 2444 (39:9-19). Munroe seemed like any other inmate
just normal, not anxious, not hyper, not loud, not quiet, and not sad. 39 R. p. 2445 (41: 14-17).

37 In actuality, Munroe was admitted to Intermountain Hospital from August 4, 2008, to August
5, 2008, because he went off his medications and was abusing alcohol and marijuana, and not for
a suicide attempt. R. p. 3851 (Lundt Aff., Ex. A, p. 7).
38 For these reasons, an inmate requesting protective custody is neither "unusual" nor "strange"
in a jail. R. p. 2366, ~ 5. On any given day, between fifteen (15) and twenty (20) inmates are
housed in protective custody at the Jail, which is indicative of an inmate's concern for his/her
own well-being. Jd. at ~ 6.
39 Noteworthy, while conducting a standing head count of Cellblock 7 sometime after 7:00 p.m.
on September 29, 2008, nearly twelve (J 2) hours after Johnson's assessment, Deputy Kevin
Manning entered Munroe's cell to check on him. R. p. 171, ~~ 5,7. Manning stated that Munroe
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When Donelson brought Munroe to Cellblock 7, the inmates housed there started joking with
Munroe, laughing, saying "hi," and "what are you doing back?" R. p. 2444 (38:1-21). Munroe
joked with them and talked to them. Jd. Munroe seemed happy to Donelson. R. p. 2444 (39:911).

Donelson explained that nothing about Munroe struck him as out of the ordinary the

morning of September 29, 2008. R. p. 2445 (43:18-23).
Deputy Drinkall testified that he spoke with Johnson after assIgnmg Munroe to a
protective custody cell. R. p. 2380 (22:13-24); R. p. 2381 (28:4-9). Drinkalliogged: "I spoke
with Jim Johnson about Munroe. Johnson did already talk to Munroe this morning in booking.
He said Munroe was not suicidal but very agitated.,,4o R. p. 2379 (19:5-19); R. p. 2380 (21:2025,22:1-7).
Johnson testified that when he left work the night of September 29, 2008, "it wasn't in
my head that Mr. Munroe, who I had met with and cleared from suicide watch, was in a cell by
himself somewhere." R. p. 2539 (246: 17-20). "I did not know that he was going to be alone.,,4!
R. p. 2538 (245:11-12). This is because at the time, Johnson did not exactly understand what the
side chute and protective custody entailed. R. p. 2538 (244:23-25, 245:1-12). Since at that time
he was fairly new to the Jail, Johnson did not have a complete understanding of the layout and
seemed fine, and even asked Manning if he could remove Munroe's empty dinner tray from his
cell. Jd.
40 In his deposition testimony, Johnson explains that he probably would have told Drinkall that
Munroe was agitated the night before (referring to September 28, 2008, the night Munroe was
arrested), but on the morning of September 29, "he is presenting as calm, and not suicidal,
denying suicidal ideation, contracting for safety." R. p. 2533 (224:24-25,225:1-16).
41 "The protection of qualified immunity applies regardless of whether the government official's
error is a 'mistake of law, a mistake of fact, or a mistake based on mixed questions of law and
fact. '" Pearson, 555 U.S. at 231 (citations omitted).
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terminology used at the Jail. ld.

Regardless, had he known that Munroe would have been

housed alone, Johnson did not believe that he would have made any major adjustment or a
change in his assessment. 42 R. p. 2539 (246:22-25, 247:1-4).
c)

Telephone Call From Rita Hoagland.

Johnson testified regarding his understanding of the phone call that took place between
Hoagland and Robertson the morning of September 29,2008:
There my understanding was that there was some concern on his mother's part,
based on some communication from Brad, that he was suicidal, that he had a
history of treatment in suicide attempts. I think Leslie actually conveyed all of
those things to me, some of which I knew. I mean, my very involvement with
him that morning was based on the fact that, at some point, he had identified
himself as suicidal.
R. p. 2507 (121:1-9).
Johnson explained that these types of calls are quite common in the Jail. R. p. 2507
(121: 15-17). Johnson further explained that the information conveyed by Hoagland was another
factor he considered that morning, which came from a collateral person who was also concerned
for Munroe, and that collateral information is critical. R. p. 2505 (113:11-12); R. p. 2507
(113 :21-23). Johnson went on to explain that even though he did not call Hoagland back,43 "the
fact that [Munroe] was suicidal, had a history of hospitalizations and treatment were all things I
42 Though this does not appear to be a situation involving an overt misunderstanding, to the
extent any miscommunication occurred between Johnson and Drinkall, as the District Court
noted, "[m ]iscommunication among employees charged with caring for suicidal inmates is often
not enough to show deliberate indifference." R. p. 2340.
43 Johnson was unaware if Hoagland had left a phone number for a return call (R. p. 2539 (249:49, 251 :3-9)), but explained that he just saw Munroe for a suicide assessment, and also would
have needed Munroe's permission to speak to Hoagland regarding his mental health, since
Munroe was over eighteen (18). R. p. 2539 (249: 11-25), R. p. 2540 (250: 1-25).
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was aware of at the time of his assessment; but, obviously, confirmed by his mother, as well, by
that phone call." R. p. 2507 (121:24-25); R. p. 2508 (122:1-6). This information was consistent
with what Johnson already knew about Munroe. R. p. 2508 (123:21-24).
The testimony above shows that Johnson's subjective knowledge was that Munroe was
not at imminent risk for suicide. As set forth below, the testimony of the Jail's psychiatrist and
the reports of the Defendants' expert witnesses support Johnson's thoughts.
d)

Michael Estess, M.D.

Dr. Michael Estess has been the Jail contract psychiatrist since the 1970's, and in 2008 he
worked with Johnson. R. p. 2397 (4:12-23). In Dr. Estess' opinion, Johnson was a conscientious
and competent social worker, and Johnson's decision in this case was based on his clinical
judgment. R. p. 2412 (63:1-2); R. pp. 2412-2414 (62:3-25 - 70:1-25). When Dr. Estess was
notified about Munroe's suicide, he asked Johnson difficult questions about Johnson's
assessment of Munroe. Id. Dr. Estess found that Johnson purposefully gathered and considered
all the information, had a basis for the decision he made and thought he made the right decision.

Id. Johnson felt like he had a relationship with Munroe, and because he had met with and made
a previous assessment, this history with Munroe led him to his determination. Id.
e)

Leslie Lundt, M.D.

Dr. Leslie Lundt, a longtime Boise psychiatrist currently residing in California, reviewed
voluminous records about Munroe, including the social background regarding Munroe's
interaction with his mother, his father, his mother's boyfriend and his mother's current husband.
R. p. 3851, Ex. 4 (Lundt Aff., Ex. A, pp. 1-14.) Dr. Lundt looked not only at Munroe's few
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days in the Ada County Jail, but at all of his nineteen (19) years.

Id.

Based on her global

consideration of Munroe, her opinion is that "the Ada County Jail personnel responded
appropriately" to Munroe. R. p. 3851, Ex. 4 (Lundt Aff., Ex. A, p. 16.) She points out that
when Munroe, "sobered up, he denied suicidal ideation when asked directly by Mr. Johnson
(who had kno'wn his baseline from his previous incarceration) and stated that he was not
interested in receiving mental health services at the jail.

Despite this, he was placed in an

environment where he could be checked every 30 minutes." Jd. Dr. Lundt continued: Munroe's
suicide was "an unplanned, impulsive gesture that could not have been predicted by jail
personnel."

Id.

Munroe had an extensive history of impulse control problems and poor

decision-making that ultimately led to his death.44 Id.
f)

Charles Novak, M.D.

Boise psychiatrist Dr. Charles Novak also reviewed extensive records about Munroe's
life, then opined, "the treatment provided by the Ada County Jail was well within the community
standards of care."

R. p. 3851, Ex. 7 (Novak Aff., Ex. A., p. 1, 2.)

Dr. Novak further

commented that Munroe had access to mental health professionals, medications and social
assistance and intervention at the Jail. R. p. 3851, Ex. 7 (Novak Aff., Ex. A., p. 2.) Dr. Novak
believes Munroe's suicide was not preventable, given that his risks were not treatable. Id. Dr.
Novak saw no deliberate indifference on the part of the Jail staff. ld.
44 The Jail telephone calls placed by Munroe the morning of September 29, 2008, are not in
evidence. However, if this Court considers Hoagland's references to the calls, this Court should
consider Dr. Lundt's thoughts regarding the phone calls - there was no evidence of psychotic
symptoms or significantly changed demeanor from his previous calls. Id. He talked of making
plans for the future, which is not expected in someone who is actively suicidal. ld.
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g) Brian Mecham, LCSW
Brian Mecham is a licensed clinical social worker with experience as a clinical director of
mental health over ten (10) Idaho jails. R. p. 3851, Ex. 5 (Mecham Aff., Ex. A.). Mecham .states
that the assessments by Johnson were acceptable and appropriate. Id. Mecham explains that he
has conducted hundreds of this sort of interview and knows much can be learned in a short
amount of time. Id. (Mecham Aff., Ex. A). Mecham is adamant that Johnson did not act with
deliberate indifference toward Munroe. Id. (Mecham Aff., Ex. A).
h)

Daniel Kennedy, Ph.D., LMSW

Dr. Daniel Kennedy is both a criminologist and a licensed social worker. R. p. 3851, Ex.
3 (Kennedy Aff., Ex. A, pp. 1, 2). As an expert witness in suicide litigation, Dr. Kelmedy
explains suicide is extremely difficult, if not impossible to predict. Id. (Kennedy Aff., Ex. A, pp.
5-7).

It is a rare event, and that lends to the difficulty of studying it.

Id.

Conversely,

overreacting to an inmate's threats, and wrongly placing him or her on a suicide watch may because of the austere and dehumanizing nature of such a watch

actually worsen the emotional

state of the inmate. Id. (Kennedy Aff., Ex. A, p. 7). Proper mental health care, then, must strike
a balance. Id. Given the factors and circumstances involved, as well as Munroe's outright denial
of current suicidal ideation and his right to refuse treatment, Dr. Kennedy explains Johnson's
decisions about Munroe fell within the range of reasonable professional discretion. Id. (Kennedy
Aff., Ex. A, p. 8).
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i)

Hoagland's Expert, Dr. Thomas White

Dr. White, a psychologist retired from the federal prison system, also admits that suicide
cannot be predicted.

R. p. 2185 (143:17-25, 144:1-2).

He further admits that he cannot

determine what people are thinking, let alone that they subjectively knew Mumoe would likely
commit suicide, as is required to prove deliberate indifference. 45 R. p. 2191 (168: 15-21).
Dr. White focuses on matters such as whether Jail staff conformed to a standard of care
and gathered sufficient information to make informed judgments.

46

R. p. 2192 (172:6-17).

Though this may be relevant in a state tort action, under § 1983 the question is not whether a
defendant should have done more to become aware of an inmate's risk of suicide. Even if a
defendant should have been aware of the risk, but did not, they have not violated the inmate's
civil rights, no matter how severe the risk.

See, Toguchi, 391 F.3d at 1057 (9 th eir. 2004)

(emphasis added). There is simply no evidence in this case that Johnson knew that Munroe
would likely commit suicide and acted indifferently to that outcome. Moreover, Dr. White's
conclusory statements on the subject lack basis in law and in fact.
What the Record does show is that Johnson has done a suicide risk assessment on every
patient he has seen for nearly thirty (30) years. R. p. 2490 (50:23-25); R. p. 2491 (51:1-2); R. p.
2537 (239:15-21).

Utilizing his clinical judgment, Johnson conducted a well thought out

assessment of Munroe, including the consideration of additional information presented to him

In fact, Dr. White does not have a correct understanding of the term deliberate indifference. R.
p. 2192 (173 :20-25); R. p. 2193 (174: 1-4). His definition does not conform to case law.
46 Dr. White nevertheless admits there are no standards regarding matters such as how to assess
suicide. R. p. 2164 (59:15-20).
45
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throughout the mornmg of September 29, 2008.

Johnson explains that Munroe's actions,

statements and outward demeanor on the mornmg of September 29, 2008, were contrary
indicators to suicide. Johnson's thoughts and actions are consistent with his clinical judgment
and belief that Munroe would not harm himself.
As such, the District Court's dismissal of Johnson should stand, both because the law was
not clearly established, and because Johnson was not deliberately indifferent to Munroe.

C.

The District Court Properly Granted Deputy Wroblewski Summary Judgment by
Finding That He Was Not Deliberately Indifferent to Munroe. 47
As argued below, the Record supports the District Court's finding that Wroblewski was

not deliberately indifferent to Munroe, and as such, his dismissal should be upheld.
1.

The District Court Correctly Applied the Standard of Deliberate Indifference. 48

The Defendants raised the defense of qualified immunity with the District Court regarding
Wroblewski. The District Court did not rule specifically on this defense, but did ultimately rule
that Wroblewski was not deliberately indifferent to Munroe. Nonetheless, the Defendants
continue to maintain that Wroblewski is entitled to qualified immunity.
48 Hoagland asserts that, "the trial court applied the wrong definition of deliberate indifference to
Ms. Hoagland's claims." Appellant's Brief, p. 34. She appears to take issue with the District
Court's citation to the Ninth Circuit in Minix, which holds that it must be shown that the
defendant, "( 1) subjectively knew the prisoner was at substantial risk of committing suicide and
(2) intentionally disregarded the risk." Minix, 597 F.3d at 831. In particular, Hoagland focuses
on the word "intentionally" and argues that a plaintiff does not need to make such a showing.
Appellant's Brief, p. 35. She supports this contention with a string cite in a footnote. These
cases, though, do not support her contention. For example, the Ninth Circuit in Clouthier v.
County o/Contra Costa, 591 F.3d 1232 (9 th Cir. 2010), states that, "there is insufficient evidence
to establish that Foley was subjectively aware that his failure to communicate Blush's
instructions to other deputies constituted a substantial risk of serious harm to Clouthier, and
deliberately ignored that risk." ld. at 1248 (emphasis added). Further, Wever v. Lincoln County,
Nebraska, 388 F.3d 601 (8 th Cir. 2004) and Bradich v. City a/Chicago, 413 F.3d 688 (7th Cir.
2005) do not address the issue of individual deliberate indifference, and do not set forth a
definition. Dorman v. District a/Columbia, 888 F.2d 159, 165 (D.C. Cir. 1989) is a Monell case
47
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In order for Hoagland to prove that Wroblewski was deliberately indifferent towards
Munroe, she must show that Wroblewski was subjectively aware that Munroe would likely

commit suicide and that he was intentionally indifferent to this outcome. As is the case with
Johnson, Hoagland can do neither, as properly recognized by the District Court.

49

In finding that Wroblewski was not deliberately indifferent, the District Court held:
To be granted summary judgment the record must show that there is no genuine
issue of material fact regarding whether Wroblewski acted in a way that
constituted deliberate indifference. After careful review of the record, and
drawing all reasonable factual inferences in Ms. Hoagland's favor, the Court
finds that Wroblewski was subjectively aware of a serious medical need, but that
he did not fail to adequately respond to that need. He did what he understood he
should do in the circumstances; his failure to notify the HSU of Munroe's answers
is understandable considering the unfortunate timing of Johnson's assessment of
Munroe coupled with the fact that Wroblewski was still in training. In retrospect,
he should have notified the HSU, however, as other courts have observed, once a
suicide has been accomplished in spite of preventative measures, it is all too easy
to point out the flaws of failure. And those flaws cannot be the basis for a finding
of fault.
R. p. 2347.

that discusses the need for a "conscious choice" in order to rise to the level of deliberate
indifference on the part of a municipality.
49 In the Appellant's Brief, Hoagland argues at length that the District Court granted Wroblewski
summary judgment on an issue "not properly raised or supported by his Restated Motion for
Summary Judgment." Appellant's Brief, p. 22- 26. This argument is a red herring, since the
Defendants clearly argued that Wroblewski was entitled to qualified immunity in their
Memorandum in Support of Restated Motion for Summary Judgment CR. pp. 1683-1690), and
again in their Reply Memorandum in Support of Restated Motion for Summary Judgment CR. pp.
2265-2274), a component of which is whether Wroblewski was deliberately indifferent to
Munroe.
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As evidenced by the above-cited language, the District Court conducted a thorough
review of the Record and correctly found that Wroblewski was not deliberately indifferent to
Munroe. Hoagland raises no legitimate issues on appeal that change this outcome.
2.

There Is No Evidence in the Record That Wroblewski Was Deliberatelv
Indifferent Towards Munroe.

Hoagland argues that the District Court misread the Record regarding Wroblewski's
interactions with Munroe. However, as argued below, the District Court correctly reiterated the
facts, but to the extent any misstatements occurred, this constitutes harmless error by the District
Court, which has no bearing on its ultimate finding that Wroblewski did not violate Munroe's
constitutional rights. "This Court will not reverse the trial court if an alleged error is harmless ....
[I]f an error did not affect a party's substantial rights or the error did not affect the result of the
trial, the error is harmless and not grounds for reversal." Taylor v. AlA Services Corp., 151
Idaho 552, ---,261 P.3d 829,836 (2011).

a.

Wroblewski Did Not Know That A1unroe Would Likely Commit Suicide.

There is no evidence in the Record that Wroblewski knew that Munroe would likely
commit suicide. 5o In the Appellant's Brief, Hoagland conveniently focuses on carefully chosen
segments of the Record while ignoring critical components of the evidence, resulting in an
incomplete picture of what really occurred between Wroblewski and Munroe, and Wroblewski's
state of mind the morning of September 29,2008.

Even though the District Court found that "Wroblewski was subjectively aware of a serious
medical need," (R. p. 2347) this is not the same as a finding that Wroblewski had actual
knowledge of the significant likelihood that Munroe would take his life. Minix, 597 F.3d at 832.
50
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Hoagland focuses on Wroblewski's training and that, in her opinion, the District Court,
"misunderstood the extent of Wroblewski's training and his understanding of the Jail's suicide
risk prevention policies." Appellant's Brief, p. 33. The District Court correctly noted that on
September 29, 2008, Wroblewski was in his last week of on-the-job training at the Jai1. 5 ] R. p.
2324. Further, the District Court correctly noted that Wroblewski was "new on the job," that
Wroblewski's trainer was present during Munroe's booking process, "and did not indicate to
Wroblewski that [he] needed to further follow up" regarding Munroe's answers to the suicide
risk assessment questions. 52 R. p. 2347.
Hoagland also focuses on the Social Stress/Suicide Risk Questionnaire that Wroblewski
completed with Munroe at approximately 8:26 a.m. that morning. Appellant's Brief, p. 29-30.
Hoagland points to the suicide risk questions to which Munroe answered "yes," but Hoagland
left out Munroe's critical answer to Wroblewski's question, "Are you currently thinking about

5] Hoagland is correct that Wroblewski had more experience than was expressly noted by the
District Court (however, not specifically noting all of Wroblewski's experience does not mean
that the District Court discounted such experience) - which makes his thoughts about Munroe's
suicide risk even more credible. Prior to joining the Jail as a commissioned deputy, Wroblewski
was a corrections officer for two (2) years for the Idaho Department of Correction at the Idaho
Maximum Security Institution, although he was not charged with the task of performing suicide
screening. R. p. 3282 (7:2-25, 8:1-14). Prior to that, Wroblewski served in Iraq for eighteen
(18) months in the Army Reserves. R. p. 3282 (8:15-25); R. p. 3283 (9:1-2). Wroblewski
attended POST twicc, where he would have received training on suicide risk reduction. R. p.
3283 (9: 13-25, 10: 1-22).
52 Hoagland states that there is nothing in the Record to support this finding. Appellant's Brief,
p. 34. However, Wroblewski's testimony indicates that although Wroblewski did not recall
whether his trainer was actually in the room when Munroe answered the questions, he was
certainly in the immediate vicinity, and was available to answer any questions Wroblewski might
have had. R. pp. 3283, 3298. There is no testimony that Wroblewski's trainer required him to
do anything further.
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suicide?" R. p. 142,

~

8; R. p. 3291 (42:23-25,43:1-14). To this question, Munroe responded,

"that he was thinking about suicide earlier but not now." Jd. As testified to in his deposition,
Wroblewski agreed that whether Munroe was thinking about suicide currently or in the past was
important in determining whether he was at risk for suicide. R. p. 3291 (43:4-15).
Hoagland also focuses on Wroblewski's perception of Munroe's appearance during the
booking process. 53 Appellant's Brief, pp. 31-32. Hoagland notes that in the Visual Observations
portion of the Initial Classification, Temporary Cell Assignment questionnaire, Wroblewski
"noted that Bradley's appearance was 'poor' and he looked sick, smelled of alcohol and
appeared to be under the influence of alcohol."

Appellant's Brief, pp. 31-32.

However,

Hoagland again fails to give this Court the complete picture. Regarding Munroe's appearance as
being "poor," Wroblewski explained at his deposition that Munroe appeared to have had too
much to drink, and that he was hung over. R. p. 3293 (52:5-15). Regarding Munroe "smelling
of alcohol" and "appearing to be under the influence of alcohol," Wroblewski again explained
that Munroe was not under the influence of alcohol, but was instead hung over:
Q.
A.
Q.
A.
Q.
A.
Q.

Okay. Would you say Bradley was intoxicated when you were talking to
him about all this stuff, or was he just hung over?
I would say that he was hung over. I I don't know. He he wasn't like
falling over himself drunk.
But he still smelled like alcohol?
Yes.
Okay. Were there aspects of his demeanor that suggested to you that he
was under the influence of alcohol still?
No, just just the odor.
Just the odor?

Noteworthy is Wroblewski's observation that Munroe's behavior did not suggest the need for
immediate psychiatric treatment. R. p. 3294 (53:13-16).

53
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A.
Q.
A.

Yes.
And he was hung over?
That's what it seemed like to me, yes.

R. p. 3302 (85:7-22).
Hoagland also emphasizes that Munroe told Wroblewski he was on Celexa, but
Wroblewski testified that he did not (and still did not at the time of his deposition) know what
Celexa was, making this an irrelevant point. R. p. 3294 (54:9-15).
Hoagland also focuses on Munroe's answer that he was seemg VISIons and hearing
VOIces. Appellant's Brief, p. 32. Hoagland once again omits Wroblewski's explanation: "He
didn't

he didn't seem out of it at all like if

for lack ofa better term. He understood all of the

questions I was asking him. He wasn't saying anything weird except for that he sometimes sees
shadow people and that they're - they tell him to run. ,,54 R. p. 3296 (61 :2-7). Wroblewski
testified that Munroe followed his directions and was cooperative during the fingerprinting and
questionnaire processes, and did not seem confused. R. p. 3290 (38:22-25); R. p. 3291 (42:2-9);
R. p. 3295 (60:24-25). Munroe seemed annoyed and angry that he was in jail, but Wroblewski
testified that everybody seems angry when they are in jail.

R. p. 3290 (39:2-4); R. p. 3289

(33:21-23); R. p. 3295 (59:15-22).

Hoagland cites to Jail phone calls made by Munroe the morning of September 29, 2008.
Appellant's Brief, p. 48. However, these phone calls were not admitted into evidence or
considered by the District Court. R. p. 3493. To the extent this Court will consider the phone
calls, it should be noted that Munroe stated to his girlfriend that he wanted Thorazine to make
him feel better that morning, and the only way he could get it was to tell the Jail staff he was
seeing visions and hearing voices. R. p. 3851, Ex. 4 (Lundt Aff., Ex. A, pp. 11-12); R. p. 3851, ~
54
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Wroblewski's testimony is clear that he did not believe Munroe was likely to commit
suicide when he was booked on the morning of September 29, 2008. Wroblewski was therefore
not deliberately indifferent to Munroe that morning.
b.

Even if Wroblewski Did Know, There Is No Evidence That He Was
Intentionally Indifferent to This Outcome.

Hoagland appears to place the greatest emphasis on Wroblewski not contacting the HSU
after answering "yes" to the question, "Does the inmate's behavior suggest a risk of suicide?"
Hoagland concludes that, "Wroblewski told no one that Bradley appeared to be at risk of
committing suicide, and took no action to abate the risk." Appellant's Brief, p. 32. Once again,
Hoagland conveniently leaves out crucial components of the picture.
Wroblewski began Munroe's booking at 8:00 a.m. on September 29, 2008. R. p. 3298
(69:5-13). Wroblewski's supervisor, Deputy Daniel Lawson, contacted the HSU and at 8:01
a.m., Johnson arrived in the booking area of the Jail and began his assessment of Munroe. R. p.
3288 (30:1-25, 31:1-17); R. p. 3298 (69:17-21). Johnson finished his assessment at 8:04 a.m.
and left the booking area. R. p. 3290 (37:15-25). Wroblewski finished fingerprinting Munroe at
approximately 8:05 a.m.

R. p. 3290 (38:1-2).

After the fingerprinting, Wroblewski placed

Munroe in the main lobby in the booking area that is in full view of the Jail staff, and where
telephones are accessible. 55 R. p. 3287 (27:6-13). At 8:26 a.m., Wroblewski took Munroe into
the JICS office where he sat Munroe down and began completing the Initial Classification,
Temporary Cell Assignment questionnaire, which included asking Munroe suicide risk
There is no testimony that Wroblewski knew Munroe placed any phone calls while in this
lobby area. R. p. 3287.

55
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questions. R. p. 3290 (40:9-14). Wroblewski finished the questionnaire with Munroe at 8:33
a.m., and then escorted Munroe out of the JICS office for housing. R. p. 3291 (44:23-25); R. p.
3292 (45: 1-2).
Hoagland focuses on the Jail's policy of having the booking deputies contact the HSU
any time an inmate answers "yes" to any of the suicide risk questions. However, Hoagland again
fails to acknowledge Wroblewski's reasonable explanation for not contacting the HSU - "Jim

Johnson was just down there and talked to him."

R. p. 3298 (71:9-13) (emphasis added).

Wroblewski repeatedly explains what happened, and Hoagland repeatedly fails to recognize it.
R. p. 3296 (63:18-25, 64:1-25); R. p. 3289 (35:6-14); R. p. 3290 (39:8-10); R. p. 3291 (42:10-25,
43:1-14); R. p. 3298 (71:9-25,72:1-19); R. p. 3299 (75:23-25, 76:1-14); R. p. 3300 (79:22-25,
80: 1-2). This certainly does not amount to deliberate indifference on the part of Wroblewski.
Even in retrospect, Wroblewski's actions were appropriate. He knew that a psychiatric
social worker just met with Munroe, and he knew that Munroe had said that he was suicidal
earlier, but not now -leaving no basis for another call to the HSU.

56

As the U.S. Supreme Court

has stated, "an official's failure to alleviate a significant risk that he should have perceived but
did not, while no cause for commendation, cannot under our cases be condemned as the
infliction of punishment." Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 838 (1994). The District Court
was thus correct in finding that Wroblewski was not deliberately indifferent towards Munroe.

56 In fact, Johnson was contacted twice following his assessment of Munroe - once regarding
Munroe's request for PC, and once after Hoagland's phone call- and Johnson did not change his
assessment. R. p. 2682 (121:24-25,122:1-6,123:23-24); R. p. 2683 (247:1-2).
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D.

The District Court Properly Granted Kate Pape Summary Judgment by Finding
That She Was Not Deliberately Indifferent to Munroe. 57
Kate Pape, the HSU Director ("Pape"), is the third individually named Defendant that

Hoagland alleges was improperly dismissed by the District Court.

And, while Johnson and

Wroblewski had personal interactions with Munroe, Pape did not. As recognized by the District
Court, in order to bring a valid claim against an individually named defendant, a "plaintiff must
allege facts, not simply conclusions, that show that an individual was personally involved in the
deprivation of his civil rights. Liability under § 1983 must be based on the personal involvement
of the defendant." Barren v. Harrington, 152 F.3d 1193, 1194 (9 th Cir. 1988). Therefore, in
order for Hoagland to be able to proceed with her claims against Pape, she must set forth specific
personal actions by Pape that resulted in Munroe's death. However, as found by the District
Court, the Record is void of any evidence that Pape had any personal interaction with Munroe.
R. p. 2353.
Alternatively, in order for Pape to be liable in her role as supervisor, Hoagland must
show that Pape condoned or acquiesced in a subordinate's unconstitutional treatment of the
inmate. Minix, 597 F.3d at 834. Hoagland cannot allege that Pape is liable simply for being a
supervisor, as respondeat superior is not a valid method of attaching liability in a § 1983 action.

See, Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009). As such, Hoagland is not allowed to attribute the
actions of others to Pape.
The Defendants raised the defense of qualified immunity with the District Court regarding
Pape. The District Court, however, did not rule specifically on this defense, but did ultimately
rule that Pape was not deliberately indifferent to Munroe. The Defendants maintain that Pape is
entitled to qualified immunity.
57
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As found by the District Court, Pape "could only be found to have been deliberately
indifferent if, in her supervisory capacity, she knew of a pattern of suicide 58 or pattern of
problems with policy enforcement by subordinates which she then condoned or to which she
acquiesced. There is nothing in the record to support such an allegation." R. pp. 2353, 2354.
On appeal, Hoagland still fails to point to any such facts in the Record.

Instead,

Hoagland cites to Dr. White's conclusory statements concerning his perception that the "ACJ
administrators did not meet their obligations to provide necessary supervision or oversight
required to ensure adequate levels of performance or policy compliance.,,59 Appellant's Brief, p.
52. Hoagland forwards no evidentiary foundation to support such claims and, as a result, her
accusations amount to little more than vague and conclusory allegations of official participation
in alleged civil rights violations, which are not sufficient to defeat dismissal in a § 1983 action. 6o

Ivey v. Ed. of Regents a/the Univ. ofAlaska, 673 F.2d 266,268 (9 th Cir. 1982).
Further, Hoagland continues to make general allegations regarding Pape without showing
how such allegations actually resulted in Munroe's suicide. Section 1983 requires that there be a

58 Hoagland cannot forward evidence that there was a pattern of suicide at the Jail, since there
has only been one (1) other suicide in the Jail from 2005-2010. R. p. 2795 (7:4-15).
Noteworthy, there were thiliy-five (35) suicide attempts that the Jail staff prevented from 20072010. R. p. 2812 (74:15-25,75:1-22).
59 Hoagland quotes Dr. White and his reference to the NCCHC (National Commission on
Correctional Health Care) accreditation of the Jail, and to Pape's knowledge of such
accreditation withdrawal. Appellant's Brief, pp. 52, 53. As Hoagland is well aware, the
standards and guidelines of accreditation organizations are not determinative as to whether a
constitutional right has been violated. See Motto v. Correctional Medical Services, Inc., 2010
WL 3852373, *16 (S.D.W.Va., Mar 23,2010) (NO. CIV.A.5:06-0163).
60 Perhaps most glaringly is the fact that Dr. White does not speak specifically to Pape's actions,
but rather to the generic "ACJ administrators."
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connection or link: between the actions of the defendants and the deprivation alleged to have been
suffered by the plaintiff. See, Monell v. New York City Dept. of Social Services, 436 U.S. 658

(1978); Rizzo v. Goode, 423 U.S. 362 (1976). For instance, Hoagland makes the broad allegation
that "Pape admitted running the medical unit in an ad hoc manner irrespective of the written
policies." Appellant's Brief, p. 53. However, a review of Pape's deposition testimony (instead
of a few carefully selected sentences taken out of context) shows that Pape was quite thoughtful
in her decisions regarding policy implementation,61 and constantly strived to improve the HSU.
R. p. 2714 (33:15-25,34:1-25,35:1-7); R. p. 2760 (218:11-25). As she considered and rewrote
the policies, she kept and followed those that were good. Id. As in any evolving system, she
changed and improved the practice before she wrote the new policy, knowing it was more
important to deliver the best patient care immediately, with the policy re-writes to follow. Id.
Along the same lines as her improper reliance on NCCHC standards to prove a
constitutional violation, Hoagland similarly points to Johnson's lack of a social worker license in
Idaho as a per se constitutional violation. Again, however, licensure status in and of itself is not
determinative of a constitutional violation. 62

Instead, the focus is on other factors such as

61 Hoagland ignores the well thought out reasoning that in certain instances, it is prudent to
follow best practices instead of written policy. For example, Pape explained that the Jail's
written policy is to have deputies hand out medications to the inmates. Upon reflection, Pape
thought it better to have nurses actually hand out the medications, and changed this practice
before the written policy was officially changed. R. p. 2753 (191 :13-25,192:1-6).
62 Johnson, who received his California clinical social worker license in 1988, held that valid
license the entire time he worked at the Jail. R. pp. 2490 (52:18-22); R. p. 2491 (55:5-25).
Johnson explained that after moving to Idaho and beginning work at the Jail, he inquired with
Idaho's licensing board regarding the process for obtaining a license. R. p. 2491 (56:1-25,57:122). He never submitted the materials, though, as he returned to California after only being in
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whether an official "refused to treat [the pnsoner or detainee], ignored his complaints,
intentionally treated him incorrectly or engaged in any similar conduct that would clearly evince
a wanton disregard for any serious medical needs." Jacobson v. Louisiana Dept. of Corrections,
2008 WL 5552232, *9 (W.D.La. Dec 17,2008) (NO. CIV.A. 08-1123) (finding that inmate had
no right to distribution of medication by licensed medical personnel) (adopted in part by
Jacobson v. Louisiana Dept. of Corrections, 2009 WL 192499 (W.D.La. Jan 23, 2009) (NO.
CIY.A. 08-1123»; see also, Brown v. Crittenden County Sheriff's Dept., 2007 WL 2316493, *3
(E.D.Ark., Aug 8, 2007) (NO. 307-CV-00083-SWW-BD) (inmate failed to state constitutional
violation based merely on allegations that defendants were "[ uJnlicense[ d], [u]nqualified,
[u]ntrained[ed], and [u]ncertified to dispense medication"). This is similarly true in the mental
health context where lack of formal licensure does not equate to a constitutional violation. See,
Minix, 597 F.3d at 831 (unlicensed mental health professional who conducted mental health
assessment of inmate who later committed suicide was entitled to summary judgment).
Hoagland also makes the even broader allegation that there "were many instances where
employees of the medical unit did not know the policies of the Jail." Appellant's Brief, p. 53.
However, Hoagland fails to cite to any portion of the Record in support of this contention other
than Johnson's deposition, in which he testifies as to his own knowledge of such policies. Jd.

Idaho for one and one-half (1 ;;;) years. R. p. 2491 (57:9-15). Johnson did not understand that
he also needed a separate license in Idaho. R. p. 2491 (57:20-25); R. p. 2492 (58: 1-12).
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As Hoagland cannot show that Pape condoned or acquiesced in a subordinate's
unconstitutional treatment of Munroe, the District Court was correct in granting her summary
judgment. Such dismissal should stand on appeal.

E.

The District Court Properly Dismissed the 1110nell Claims Against Ada County.
In Nation, this Court (incorporating U.S. Supreme Court precedent) explained the

circumstances in which a government could be sued under § 1983:
Local governments can be sued directly under section 1983 where a "policy
statement, ordinance, regulation, or decision officially adopted and promulgated
by that body's officers" deprives an individual of his or her constitutional rights.
Monell, 436 U.S. at 690. Additionally, governmental entities may be sued if their
unofficial custom works a constitutional deprivation.

Nation, 144 Idaho at 186, 158 P.3d at 962.
This is often referred to as a Monell claim and reqUlres provmg a widespread
unconstitutional practice so persistent, permanent, and well-settled that the governing body of
Ada Countl3 had actual or constructive notice of it. See, Bennett v. City of Slidell, 735 F.2d
861, 862 (5 th Cir. 1984) (en banc). Moreover, the policy must be a deliberate and conscious
choice. City of Canton v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378, 389 (1989). In addition, "[t]here also must be a
'direct causal link' between the policy or custom and the injury ... " Anderson v. Warner, 451
F.3d 1063, 1070 (9 th Cir. 2006).
Thus, to be able to pursue a § 1983 claim against a government, a plaintiff must
demonstrate that there is (i) an express unconstitutional policy (i.e. ordinance, resolution, etc.)

63 The governing body of Ada County is the Board of Ada County Commissioners and its official
designees. See Idaho Code § 31-602.
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that was enacted by the government, or (ii) an unofficial unconstitutional custom adopted by the
government. The plaintiff must also demonstrate a "direct causal link" between the policy or
custom and the injury.
In this particular instance, Hoagland has not pointed to any Ada County policy as
unconstitutional. In fact, as recognized by the District Court, Hoagland appears to concede that
Ada County had "perfectly reasonable written policies being in place to identify, protect, and
treat inmates who are at risk for suicide .... " R. p. 1504,

~

284. As a result, the only remaining

avenue to pursue Ada County would be through an unconstitutional custom adopted by Ada
County. However, this is difficult for a plaintiff to prove since limited instances do not provide a
sufficient basis to demonstrate the existence of a custom: "A custom or policy must be shown by
a 'clear and persistent pattern,' and three discreet instances in one investigation is simply not
enough [for a jury] to reasonably draw such a conclusion." Peet v. City of Detroit, 502 F.3d 557,
568 (6 th Cir. 2007); see also, Anderson, 451 F.3d at 1070 (the plaintiff "must be able to
demonstrate that the injury resulted from a 'permanent and well settled practice. "').
Hoagland sidesteps her burden of proving an unconstitutional custom by arguing that
official policies at the Jail were not implemented properly and, as a result, somehow fell below
constitutional standards. This is problematic for a number of reasons.
To begin with, Hoagland's theory relies on the assumption that failure to follow policies
equates to a per se constitutional violation. However, Hoagland provides no legal authority to
support such a contention and, indeed, cannot do so given that is not the law, and given that

RESPONDENTS' BRIEF - PAGE 63

adopted policies could far exceed constitutional minima. Hoagland must demonstrate the actual
constitutional deprivation that underlies her claim.
Moreover, merely referencing the affidavits of her experts, Dr. White and Dr. Metzner, as
creating genuine issues of material fact is misleading. Hoagland must identify the particular
"systematic problems with the manner in which healthcare was delivered to the inmates at the
Jail," she alleges exist and then show how they actually resulted in a constitutional deprivation.
Appellant's Brief, pp. 50-5l. She has failed to do so.
Notwithstanding the fact that Hoagland has not clearly set forth an unconstitutional
"unofficial custom," even if she could she would still need to demonstrate the direct causal link
to Munroe's suicide.

Anderson, 451 F.3d at 1070.

Again, however, Hoagland has not

specifically set forth how alleged "systemic problems" actually led to Munroe's death. Not only
are Dr. White's statements highly speculative, especially given the lack of explanation regarding
a nexus, but are additionally problematic given that Dr. White freely admits that nobody can
predict suicide or even prevent it. R. p. 2185 (144: 1-2); R. p. 2192 (172: 18-25).
As held by the District Court, "the record does not sustain a finding that Ada County
either adopted an unconstitutional policy, or that a pattern is present that shows Ada County's
practices constituted an unconstitutional custom." R. p. 2338. Given Hoagland's failure to do
more than offer conclusory statements,64 the dismissal of her Monell claim should be upheld.

64 A plaintiff must offer more than mere vague and conclusory allegations of official
participation in civil rights violations. Ivey, 673 F.2d at 268.
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F.

The District Court Acted Within the Bounds of I.R.c.P. 54( d)(l) and Properly
Exercised Its Discretion When Awarding the Defendants Their Costs as a Matter of
Right and a Majority of Their Discretionary Costs.
The District Court awarded the Defendants $15,815.31 in costs as a matter of right, and

$77,438.12 in discretionary costs. Since the Defendants were the prevailing parties pursuant to
I.R.C.P. 54( d)(1), it was appropriate for the District Court to make such an award.
1.

As the Prevailing Parties, the Defendants Are Entitled to Recover All of Their
Costs as a Matter of Right.

Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 54( d)(1) provides that "costs shall be awarded as a matter
of right to the prevailing party or parties .... " "The prevailing party in a civil action has a right
to seek reimbursement of the costs incurred in prosecuting or defending the action," Fish v.
Smith, 131 Idaho 492, 493, 960 P.2d 175, 176 (1998).
a.

Standard of Review.

When awarding a party's costs as a matter of right, the trial court must follow the
guidelines set forth in LR.C.P. 54(d)(1)(C). George W Watkins Family v. Messenger, 115 Idaho
386,391,766 P.2d 1267, 1272 (1988). "The question ofa trial court's compliance with the rules
of civil procedure relating to the recovery of attorney fees or costs is one of law upon which an
appellate court exercises free review." JR. Simplot Co. v. Chemetics Intern, Inc., 130 Idaho 255,
257, 939 P.2d 574, 576 (1997).
b.

The District Court's Award of$1 5,81 5.31 in Costs as a Matter of Right
Falls Within the Guidelines ofIR. CPo 54(d)(J ) (C).

Hoagland argues that the Defendants should not have been awarded $500.00 in costs paid
to Canyon County Transcriptions for the transcription of Jail telephone calls placed by Munroe.
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R. pp. 3802-3813. However, Hoagland failed to object to this claim with the District Court. See,
I.R.C.P. 54( d)(6).

Since she did not make this argument to the District Court below, she

consequently cannot raise it for the first time on appeal. R. pp. 3802-3813.
Even if Hoagland can make this argument now, it is without merit. LR.C.P.54(d)(1)(C)6
allows for the recovery of the "[r]easonable costs of the preparation of models, maps, pictures,
photographs, or other exhibits admitted in evidence as exhibits in a hearing or trial of an
action .... " As twenty-four (24) of the twenty-five (25) Defendants were dismissed three (3)
weeks before trial, the transcripts could not have been admitted into evidence at trial. However,
the Defendants did incur these costs, and such award should be upheld.
Hoagland also argues that the award of $182.81 in service fees is not allowable. I.R.C.P.
54(d)(1)(C)2 allows for the recovery of "[a]ctual fees for service of any pleading or document in
the action whether served by a public officer or other person." These costs are "actual fees for
service," and although the documents were not ultimately served on the intended recipient, the
Rule does not specifically provide that attempted service fees are not recoverable.
Finally, Hoagland argues that $415.00 in court reporter fees is not recoverable. I.R.C.P.
54( d)(1 )(C)9 provides that "[ c]harges for reporting and transcribing of a deposition taken in
preparation for trial of an action, whether or not read into evidence in the trial of an action," are
costs as a matter of right. These fees were charged to the Defendants by various court reporting
agencies for depositions that were ultimately cancelled, but the fees were still charged and were
still costs incurred by the Defendants in defense of this litigation.
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In this case, the award of all of the Defendants' costs as a matter of right was within the
parameters of LR.C.P. 54( d)(1 )(C), and should be upheld on appeal.
2.

The District Court Acted Within Its Discretion in Awarding a Majority of the
Defendants' Discretionary Costs.

The prevailing party in a case may seek an award of its discretionary costs. I.R.C.P.
54( d)(1 )(D). Here, the District Court acted within the bounds of its discretion when awarding
the Defendants a majority of their discretionary costs, and Hoagland has failed to offer any
legitimate argument that the District Court abused its discretion.
a.

Standard of Review.

Regarding discretionary costs, it is within the trial court's discretion whether to make
such an award to the prevailing party. Van Brunt v. Stoddard, l36 Idaho 681, 688-689, 39 P.3d
621, 628-629 (2001).

On appeal, the party opposing such an award bears the burden of

demonstrating that the district court abused its discretion. Puckett v. Verska, 144 Idaho 161, 169,
158 P.3d 937, 945 (2007).
b.

The Defendants Mel Their Burden Regarding Discretionary Costs.

Hoagland alleges that the Defendants did not show that their discretionary costs were
necessary, exceptional and reasonably incurred, and should in the interest of justice be assessed
against her. However, a review of the Record shows that the Defendants did meet this burden.
In the Appellant's Brief, Hoagland makes an incorrect generalization regarding
exceptional costs

"[rJoutine litigation costs are not exceptional," citing Fish in support of this

contention. Appellant's Brief, p. 60. However, this is the same erroneous argument made in
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Wooley Trust v. DeBest Plumbing, 133 Idaho 180, 983 P .2d 834 (1999).

In that case, Phillippi

Plaza argued that the trial court abused its discretion when awarding DeBest Plumbing
discretionary costs for a consulting fee paid to a fire expert, costs of photographs taken for the
benefit of the expert, and airfare for DeB est' s counsel to fly to California to take depositions.
Phillippi Plaza argued that none of the costs were exceptional. ld., at 186, 840. Phillippi Plaza
also wrongly argued that Fish stood for the proposition that expert fees and travel costs are never
exceptional. This Court corrected Phillippi Plaza by stating, "Phillippi Plaza reads Fish as a
determination that expert fees and travel costs are not exceptional.

This is incorrect.

Fish

merely applied the abuse of discretion standard and concluded that the district court did not
abuse its discretion." ld., at 187, 841.
Here, Hoagland's similar argument fails, since discretionary costs can include "travel
expenses along with other expenses such as photocopying, faxes, postage and long distance
telephone calls."

Wooley Trust, 133 Idaho at 187, 983 P.2d at 841. Costs can also include

photographs and additional expert witness fees, and airfare for counsel to travel to take
depositions. ld. As long as the district court makes the required finding, this Court has allowed
such awards to stand unless the District Court abused its discretion.
As found by the District Court, this is an exceptional case 65 involving unique factual
scenarios and legal arguments. SUpp. R. pp. 133-144. Section 1983 cases themselves are not
common (especially when brought in state court), particularly when they involve inmate suicide
65 As further evidence that this case is exceptional, Hoagland initially lodged with this Court a
one hundred-two (102) page brief (twice the length as that allowed by the I.A.R.). This Court
returned the brief, only allowing Hoagland a total of eighty-five (85) pages.
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and lvionell claims.

Further, as the Record shows, the suicide of an inmate in the Jail is

extremely rare, with only one (1) other completed suicide from 2005-2010. R. p. 2795 (7:4-15).
Since this case involved a suicide, Munroe's thought process and state of mind was
unknown. It was therefore incumbent upon the Defendants to reconstruct what occurred

they

were required to put the pieces together to try and reconstruct a complete picture of Munroe's
life and his state of mind in order to properly defend the allegations brought against them. This
constituted exceptional preparation by the Defendants in putting together their defense.
This case was also procedurally exceptional and, contrary to Hoagland's arguments, was
exactly the type of case in which discretionary costs should be awarded. A review of the Record
shows just how exceptional and out of the ordinary this case has been. 66
c.

Hoagland Cannot Meet Her Burden o[Proving That the District Court
Abused Its Discretion in Awarding Discretionary Costs.

On appeal, the party opposing an award of discretionary costs bears the burden of
demonstrating that the district court abused its discretion. Puckett, 144 Idaho at 169, 158 P.3d at
945. Hoagland cannot meet this burden.
The District Court, after making specific findings regarding why it believed that this case
was procedurally and factually exceptional, held:
Therefore, because of the nature of the claims in this case and the complexity of
the work Defendants und~rtook to defend against those claims, Defendants'
request for discretionary costs for deposition travel costs, expert fees, copies of
records, and investigator fees were exceptional, necessary, and reasonably
incurred. The remaining consideration for the Court is whether it is in the interest
of justice to assess discretionary costs against Plaintiff. This is a discretionary

66

See the Procedural History in Section LA. herein, pp. 1-3.

RESPONDENTS' BRIEF

PAGE 69

decision for the Court. Reasonable minds may differ as to whether it is in the
interest of justice to award discretionary costs to Defendants. The natural
inclination in a case such as this is to feel sympathy for a parent whose child died
young and tragically. However, it is not unjust to award discretionary costs here.
The Court finds it is in the interest of justice to award discretionary costs to
Defendants.
Supp. R. p. 140.
The District Court then made its ultimate finding and award:
The following of Defendants' requested discretionary costs were necessary,
exceptional, reasonably incurred, and should be assessed against the adverse party
in the interest of justice: 1) deposition travel costs ($12,140.53); 2) Defendants'
expert fees ($63,060.84); 3) expert fees (Plaintiff) (over $2,000 cap) ($1,700.00);
4) copies of records ($303.00); and 5) investigator fees ($233.75). The total
amount of discretionary costs awarded to Defendants is $77,438.12.
ld. This Court has held that "[ eJxpress findings as to the general character of requested costs and
whether such costs are necessary, reasonable, exceptional, and in the interest of justice is
sufficient" to comply with the requirements of I.R.C.P. 54(d)(l)(D).

Hayden Lake Fire

Protection District v. Alcorn, 141 Idaho 307, 314, 109 P.3d 161,168 (2005).
This Court has also held that trial courts need not evaluate the requested costs item by
item. Puckett, 144 at 170, 158 P.3d at 946. "A court may evaluate whether costs are exceptional
within the context of the nature of the case." City of McCall v. JP. Seubert, 142 Idaho 580, 588,
l30 P.3d 1118, 1126 (2006).

This is exactly what the District Court did below. However,

Hoagland spends several pages in the Appellant's Brief reciting how certain individual costs
should not have been awarded because there was no support for such charges. 67 In actuality,

67 It is interesting to note that three (3) categories of costs complained of by Hoagland were not
actually awarded by the District Court $509.36 in postage, notary charges, and Federal Express
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there is ample evidence in the Record to support such an award.

Supp. R. pp. 50-56. The

copying and investigator charges were awarded because, "Plaintiffs discovery production was
limited. As a result, while undertaking their own investigation, Defendants inculTed copying
fees and investigator fees.,,68 Supp. R. p. 140. The travel expenses were awarded because, "[I]n
preparation for trial, Defendants took nine depositions and defended eighteen depositions, some
of which required Defendants to incur travel expenses." Id. The excess fees paid to Hoagland's
experts were awarded because, "Defendants also paid expert witness fees over the $2,000 cap
allowed by Rule 54(d)(l)(C) in order to depose Plaintiffs expert witnesses."

Id.

The

Defendants' expert witness fees were awarded because, "Defendants hired experts of their own,
including a jail suicide expeli, psychiatrists, an expert social worker, and a pharmacologist." Id.
d.

There Is No Requirement That a Trial Court Must Consider the NonPrevailing Party's Ability to Pay When Awarding Discretionary Costs.

At the hearing held before the District Court regarding the Defendants Memorandum of
Costs, the District Court, almost as an aside, posed the question, "But I wonder if I can really - if
her poverty is or her ability to pay is one of the factors that I should consider in determining
whether or not the interest of justice require that they be paid." Tr. 09/15111 Hearing (29: 19-23).
After raising this matter, the District Court recognized that the Record most likely is void of any
such evidence. "You know, do I really have enough, though, in the Record other than just my

charges; $1,181.52 for AES Temporary Employee charges; and $490.00 of the remaining Jail
phone call transcription charges.
68 Hoagland argues that the trial court "referenced each category of costs but never discussed any
of the actual costs involved." Appellant's Brief, p. 82-83. This is simply not the case.
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supposition based on those phone calls which were submitted for a different purpose, to conclude
as a matter of fact that she is poor?,,69 Tr. 09/15111 Hearing (30:12-16).
In response to the Defendants' arguments as to why Hoagland's financial status is not a
proper factor to consider, the District Court stated:
There might be some case that's just right on point on this question of whether or
not it is appropriate for the court to consider the relative wealth of a litigant in
making this determination about whether or not it's in the interest of justice to
award these discretionary costs to the prevailing party .... it seems to me if you did
a quick Westlaw search, if there is such a case in this jurisdiction, you might be
able to pull it up in a heartbeat.. .. f'm not looking for affidavits from her saying
''I'm broke" or anything like that or tax returns. I'm looking for any case law
that might help the court.
Tr. 09/15/11 Hearing (33:16-25,34:1-25,35:1-2).
When searching Idaho case law as requested by the District Court, the Defendants were
unable to find any Idaho state case law discussing whether a court can consider a non-prevailing
party's alleged "poveliy" when deciding such a request, as the cases primarily focus on the
general notion of whether the district court was acting within its discretion when reaching its
determination. Hoagland also recognized that this Court has not made a party's ability to pay a
costs award a factor to be considered by a trial court. Supp. R. pp. 118-l32; Appellant's Brief, p.
86. This is because the focus of the Rule, and the discussions by this Court, are on the nature of

the costs themselves, and not whether it might be a hardship for the non-prevailing party.

69 As noted above, the Jail phone calls were expressly stricken by the District Court. They
certainly were not presented for the purpose of determining Hoagland's financial status and, the
Defendants submit, should not be used for such purpose.
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Rule 54(d)(1)(D) (and case law interpreting the Rule) does not contemplate an analysis of
whether it would be difficult for a non-prevailing party to pay costs. If this were the case, then
district courts would have to engage in a separate analysis regarding the financial status of the
non-prevailing party, which most likely could only effectively and fairly be accomplished
through evidentiary proceedings or further discovery on the matter (since in most cases the
record would not contain adequate facts to allow the court to reach such a determination). Such
an analysis could thwart the purpose of allowing an award of discretionary costs to the prevailing
party, and would certainly be contrary to the notion of judicial economy.
While the granting or denying of discretionary costs is clearly within the trial court's
discretion, neither the Rule nor case law contemplate an analysis of the non-prevailing party's
ability to pay, but rather, the court must make findings regarding the nature of the costs claimed.
As such, it remains the Defendants' position that Hoagland's financial status is not an
appropriate factor to be considered. 70
e.

Even if There Is Such a Requirement, the Record Does Not Support a
Finding that Hoagland Is Impoverished.

If this Court requires the consideration of a non-prevailing party's financial status, the
Record contains insufficient facts to support a reversal on the basis that Hoagland cannot pay.71
Even though the District Court instructed on the record that it was "not looking for
affidavits from [Hoagland] saying 'I'm broke' or anything like that or tax returns," Hoagland
70 In fact, the District Court seems to have not considered this as a factor, since the Order does
not discuss this issue.
71 The fact that the Record is void of any such evidence was recognized by the District Court at
the September 15,2011 hearing. Tr. 09115111 Hearing (30:12-16).
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disregarded the District Court's instruction and filed just such an affidavit ("Affidavit"). Supp.
R. pp. 114-117.

This Affidavit may not have made the case that Hoagland wished, as in

actuality, both Hoagland and her husband are employed and they have approximately $122,520
in equity in their house.72 By her own words, Hoagland is neither destitute nor impoverished.
The Record does contain another affidavit from Hoagland filed on April 9, 2009 ("2009
Affidavit"), which was filed in an attempt to persuade the District Court to waive the posting of a
bond in this case. The District Court nonetheless required the posting of the bond, and Hoagland
did. However, there are several difficulties in using the 2009 Affidavit. First, it was completed
in an ex parte proceeding for the sole purpose of attempting to waive the bond requirement.
Second, it was filed over three (3) years ago, and is not reflective of her current financial status.
Third, at least one of the facts has changed, as Hoagland no longer has a minor child. At the
very least, the Record does not contain a complete picture of Hoagland's current financial status.
As required by LR.C.P. 54(d)(l)(D), the District Court's inquiry properly revolved
around the nature of the discretionary costs claimed by the Defendants, and not on whether
Hoagland can pay these costs. Should this Court determine otherwise, however, the Record does
not contain any facts indicative that Hoagland cannot pay.

IV.

ATTORNEY FEES ON APPEAL

Should the Defendants prevail on appeal, they request attorney fees pursuant to Idaho
Code §§ 12-121, 12-123, LA.R. 41, and/or42 U.S.C. § 1988(b).

72 Hoagland's assessed house value
Supp. R. p. 115.
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IS

$177,520, less her outstanding mortgage of $53,000.

As explained in Rudd v. Merritt, 138 Idaho 526, 533, 66 P.3d 230,237 (2003), this Court
will award attorney fees under Idaho Code § 12-121 only where the entire appeal was brought or
pursued frivolously, unreasonably or without foundation.

Because the series is disjunctive,

attorney fees can be awarded where the appeal is without foundation or unreasonable or
frivolously filed.
Hoagland appeals all of her District Court dismissals. Continuing this case on appeal
suggests that Hoagland has failed to take into account that she suffered dismissal of each plaintiff
and every cause of action against every defendant in every capacity. Logic dictates that her
appeal can have no more basis than her dismissed case below. Her Appellant's Brief does not
forward any legitimate argument of reversible error by the District Court.

Continuing this

litigation on appeal after the District Court explained (sometimes repeatedly) why her case failed
is unreasonable. Her appeal can thus be seen as frivolous, unreasonable, or without foundation.

V.

CONCLUSION

Consistent with Idaho law, the District Court properly concluded that the Estate is not a
valid § 1983 plaintiff, and Hoagland offers no argument that would require a different outcome.
Further, the District Court's dismissal of all of the Defendants should stand, since the District
Court properly granted James Johnson qualified immunity, properly held that Jeremy
Wroblewski and Kate Pape were not deliberately indifferent to Munroe, and properly found that
Ada County did not adopt an unconstitutional policy and that its practices did not represent an
unconstitutional custom. Finally, the District Court's award of costs as a matter of right and
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discretionary costs should be upheld, since the Defendants were the prevailing parties, and the
Record supports such an award.
The Defendants therefore respectfully request that this Court uphold the District Court's
dismissal of Hoagland's entire case, uphold the award of costs, and grant the Defendants their
costs and fees on appeal.
.~~

Respectfully submitted this

1S

day of March 2012.
GREG H. BOWER
Ada County Prosecuting Attorney
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Sherry A. Morga
Senior Deputy Prosecuting Attorney
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